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This thesis analyses di¤erent approaches to address the unemployment
volatility puzzle. In the rst two chapters, we develop two types of search
frictions model with e¢ ciency wages. The models can match observed uc-
tuations in unemployment and job vacancies in the U.S economy. Moreover,
the models also capture labour market dynamics well. In the third chapter,
we analyse two proposed solutions to the unemployment volatility puzzle:
sticky wages and a small hiring surplus. We investigate a widely used
calibration strategy in the literature and argue that it is a key factor in gen-
erating large unemployment volatility. In the fourth chapter, we reassess the
following arguments on the unemployment volatility puzzle: strategic wage
bargaining; large uctuations in discount rates in the nancial market; and
endogenous job separations caused by idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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Overview
In recent decades, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and
matching model has emerged as the workhorse model for the analysis of
unemployment and related policy issues. It gives an appealing description
of how unemployment arises in equilibrium and what makes it change over
time. However, as is widely known, the model is incapable of matching
the observed uctuations in unemployment and job vacancies; this is often
referred to as the unemployment volatility puzzle.
In this thesis, we analyse di¤erent approaches to address this puzzle. Our
rst approach involves modelling a di¤erent approach to wage formation
based on e¢ ciency wage theory. The motivation for doing this is the fact that
the wage under Nash bargaining in the standard DMP model is too sensitive
to labour productivity, causing job vacancies and unemployment to have
almost no response to productivity shocks, contrary to what is observed in
the data. In the rst chapter, we replace Nash wage bargaining with a Solow-
type e¢ ciency wage mechanism, in which the amount of e¤ort expended by
workers is determined by the proportional gap between the real wage and a
reference wage (see for example, Solow (1979) and Summers (1984)). In this
e¢ ciency wage context, the cyclicality of the optimal wage largely depends
on the cyclicality of the reference wage.
We propose two alternative ways to dene the reference wage. One in-
corporates the idea of social normsand fair wagesin the e¢ ciency wage
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literature (see for example, Elster (1989) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988)).
The second one is based on search theory; we use the expected discounted
value of being unemployed as the reference wage. We show that, in both
cases, wages are less responsive to productivity shocks than with Nash bar-
gaining. The economic intuition behind the second approach is especially
interesting. Under rational expectations, workers realise that a temporary
technology shock only has a limited e¤ect on their outside option which is
based on their expected life-time career path. So workers know that any in-
crease in the wage they might earn from alternative employment that results
from a positive productivity shock cannot last long since the shock is tem-
porary. This interpretation is similar to the permanent income hypothesis
in consumption theory, see Friedman (1957).
In the second chapter, we explore the implications of an alternative type of
e¢ ciency wage mechanism for unemployment volatility. Following Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984), we assume that e¤ort is binary, corresponding to a
worker choosing to shirk or not. In this context, the wage responds to a
productivity shock if and only if the job nding rate responds to produc-
tivity. If the job nding rate increases after a positive productivity shock,
then the relative value of being unemployed to a worker also increases. This
reduces the potential loss from being red if the worker chooses to shirk
since it becomes easier to nd a new job. As a result, the rm has to raise
the wage to increase the threat point faced by workers. Empirical evidence
shows that job nding rate is not as volatile as other labour market variables
such as labour market tightness. This provides another way to explain the
mild cyclicality of the wage.
The rst two chapters show that e¢ ciency wage theory can address the
unemployment volatility puzzle when this is incorporated into a dynamic
labour market with search frictions. Using standard calibrations, we show
that the models in the rst two chapters can match the observed value of key
labour market indicators in the U.S economy, such as the average unemploy-
ment rate and the rates at which unemployed workers nd jobs. Moreover,
the models can generate the observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations
in unemployment, job vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment ratio in re-
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sponse to shocks of a plausible magnitude. Also, the models outform the
standard DMP model in terms of capturing some dynamic features of the
U.S labour market, such as the correlations and autocorrelation of key labour
market indicators.
There is a large amount of work discussing alternative approaches to
address the unemployment volatility puzzle. For example, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) controversially raise the value of leisure when they cali-
brate the standard DMP model; Pissarides (2009) introduces xed matching
costs to the DMP model; Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) embed credit
frictions into the DMP model.
In the third chapter, we point out a common channel behind those al-
ternative approaches. This common channel works through a high rate of
lling a vacancy. A high rate of lling a vacancy makes any newly posted va-
cancy due to a positive productivity shock more likely to be lled and makes
any reduction of job vacancies due to a negative productivity shock more
likely to be transmitted to job losses. This generates larger uctuations in
unemployment. We argue that to acheive a high vacancy-lling rate, those
scenarios diminish the rms benet from hiring a worker. This leads to
low incentives for vacancy creation and causes increased slack in the labour
market, which in turn shortens the duration of a vacancy and increases the
vacancy-lling rate. We refer this channel as the small hiring surplus. We
argue that, in terms of generating unemployment volatility, the small hir-
ing surplus is a complement to another common approach which is often
referred as the sticky wage. The sticky wageensures that job vacancies
vary with labour productivity. The small hiring surplusensures that any
variation in job vacancies is more likely to be transmitted to variation in
unemployment.
Also in the third chapter, we investigate a widely used calibration strategy
in the literature, which is obscured by di¤erent time periods used in cali-
brations (see for example, Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and
Hall and Milgrom (2008)). This calibration strategy raises the relative cost
of creating a job vacancy. We adjust the calibrations used in di¤erent papers
to make them all correspond to a monthly frequency. It turns out that a
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large vacancy posting cost is associated with a high matching e¢ ciency and
high vacancy-lling rate. We further argue that this strategy implies a large
unemployment volatility.
The fourth chapter contains a critical review of recent developments in the
literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle. Specically, we reassess
the arguments on: strategic wage bargaining; large uctuations in discount
rates in the nancial market; and endogenous job separations caused by
idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
We argue that the success of models with strategic wage bargaining in
addressing the unemployment volatility puzzle is largely due to the assump-
tion a xed cost of delay in wage negotiations. However a xed cost of delay
may not be a plausible assumption in the search frictions model since the
major cost of delay is likely to be the value of the lost production due to
the delay of reaching a wage agreement, which is pro-cyclical. We argue
that if we assume a pro-cyclical cost of delay, the model with strategic wage
bargaining cannot replicate the observed unemployment uctuations under
plausible calibrations of the structural parameters.
There is a rapidly growing literature focusing on the observed co-movement
between the job hiring and discount rates in the U.S nancial market. One
of the most recent papers, written by Hall (2015), suggests that the discount
rate in the stock market is a driving force of unemployment uctuations in
the U.S economy. Although we acknowledge this co-movement, we have
doubts about the mechanism Hall (2015) proposed. Specically, we doubt
that the discount rate is the main channel that transmits uctuations in
nancial markets to job hiring. We show that if Halls hypothesis were true,
then if we endogenize job destruction in the standard DMP model, one
implication would be that job destructions decrease with the discount rates
in the stock market, which contradicts the observed facts in nancial crisis.
We also show that Hall (2015)s results rely heavily on his wage specication.
In the nal section, we show that endogenous job destruction can increase
the volatility of labour market tightness, especially when reservation pro-
ductivity is high. Reservation productivity is the lower bound of production
below which job separation occurs. High reservation productivity triggers
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large ows into unemployment. Large inows to unemployment slacken the
labour market, increasing the outows from unemployment. The two larger
ows lead to a more volatile labour market. We also show that reserva-
tion productivity is negatively correlated with aggregate productivity. One
implication is that job destruction may not be a key factor for generating




Search Frictions, E¢ ciencyWages and Un-
employment Fluctuations
Abstract
This chapter analyses unemployment uctuations in a model that adds
a Solow-type e¢ ciency wage e¤ect to an otherwise standard search fric-
tions model of the labour maket. We argue that our model outperfoms the
standard search frictions model in two key aspects: (i) our model can gen-
erate the observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment
and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. This is
largely because wages are less responsive to unemployment when e¢ ciency
wage e¤ects are considered; (ii) our model also captures labour market dy-
namics well. We also extend the e¢ ciency wage literature by (i) extending
the well-known Solow condition to allow for search and matching frictions




Explaining unemployment is one of the central problems in economics. The
currently dominant approach in the literature is the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (DMP) search and matching model (e.g. Diamond, 1982, Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000). This provides a simple framework
for the analysis of the labour market and associated policy issues (eg, Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2010). However, as widely known, the model
is incapable of generating the observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations
in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible mag-
nitude, which is often referred as the unemployment volatility puzzle.
The standard DMP model has two main elements. The rst is a model
of the imperfect matching of workers with jobs, explaining why unemployed
workers coexist with unlled job vacancies. This is an essential part of the
model. The second is a model of how the surpluses accruing to workers and
rms from a job match are divided between the parties through bargaining
over the real wage. In the search frictions model, Nash wage bargaining en-
sures that the real wage exceeds the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure and thus explains the existence of involuntary un-
employment. However, the literature has argued that the wage under Nash
bargaining is too sensitive to labour productivity, causing job vacancies and
unemployment to have almost no response to productivity shocks.
In this paper, we replace Nash bargaining with e¢ ciency wages and ex-
plore this alternative type of search frictions model. There is a small existing
literature on this. Malcomson and Mavroeidis (2007) develop an empirical
model that incorporates a Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) no-shirking constraint
into a search frictions model; see also Pissarides and Mortensen (1999) and
Zaharieva (2010). We take a di¤erent approach. We combine search fric-
tions with a simple model of e¢ ciency wages, similar to Solow (1979) and
Summers (1984)1, in which output depends on technology and the amount
of e¤ort expended by workers, which is determined by the proportional gap
1Danthine and Kurmann (2008, 2010) incorporate a Solow-type e¢ ciency wage mech-
anism into a DSGE model, the paper addresses the observed response of macro-variables
to monetary policy shocks.
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between the real wage and a reference wage. In a pure e¢ ciency wage con-
text, an individual rm minimizes the cost of e¤ective labour by maintaining
an optimal proportional gap between the real wage and the reference wage.
When a productivity shock hits the economy, rms adjust the real wage if
(i) the reference wage changes with productivity; or (ii) the optimal propor-
tional gap changes with productivity.
We propose two alternative ways to dene the reference wage. One
incorporates the idea of social normsand fair wagesin the e¢ ciency wage
literature (see for example, Elster (1989) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988)).
The second one is based on search theory, choosing the expected discounted
value of being unemployed as the reference wage. We show that, using
standard values for structural parameters, the reference wage in both set
ups have little response to productivity, displaying strong stickness. The
stickness of the reference wage based on social norms and fair wages comes
from the psychological hypothesis that workers normally prefer to receive a
smooth income ow. The stickness of the reference wage based on search
theory comes from the fact that a temporary productivity shock can hardly
have long-lasting e¤ect on both the probability of nding a job and the future
wage payment, therefore having a limited e¤ect on a workers reservation
wage.
We show that e¢ ciency wage theory can explain why wages are less re-
sponsive to productivity shocks when this hypothesis is incorporated into a
dynamic labour market with search frictions. When a Solow-type e¢ ciency
wage model is considered, the cyclicality of the wage depends on the cycli-
cality of the reference wage of workers. We give two alternative ways to
dene the reference wage. One is based on the idea of social norms and fair
wages. The other one is based on the expected return of outside option.
In the second approach, under rational expectations, workers realise that a
temporary technology shock only has a limited e¤ect on the expected return
of the outside option which is measured based on their expected life-time
career path. So unless workers are myopic, workers know even if they suc-
cessfully switch to another job which comes with a higher payment when
a positive productivity shock is observed, such a relatively high payment
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cannot last long since the shock is temporary. As a result, they prefer to
stay in the current job to receive a stable income although their employers
do not increase the wage much. This microfounded reference wage plays a
key role in delivering the little cyclical variation of the wage.
The chapter has four contributions. First, we develop a simple analytical
model by adding the e¢ ciency wage e¤ect described above to an otherwise
standard search frictions model. We obtain a simple expression for the
optimal wage. Wages have similar determinants as in the standard DMP
model: income available to unemployed workers, the job vacancy posting-
cost, the rate at which job matches are disolved and the unemployment rate.
However the mechanisms behind wage formation are di¤erent. In the search
frictions model, wages are determined through the sharing of the surplus
from a continuing job match between worker and rm. Thus a rise in the
cost of posting a vacancy increases the value of a continuing job match
and so increases the wage. This increases the cost of labour and leads to
lower employment. In the e¢ ciency wage model, by contrast, the rm sets
the wage unilaterally. The wage a¤ects productivity as well as the cost of
labour and so the rm chooses the wage to minimise the cost of labour per
unit of e¤ort. A rise in the cost of lling a vacancy will lead to a reduction
in employment and an increase in e¤ort, this latter requiring an increase
in the wage. The wage in our model displays much stronger stickness in
terms of its response to productivity shocks than the Nash bargained wage.
Therefore we provide an alternative approach to modelling the sticky wage.2
Second, using standard values for the structural parameters, we show that
our model can match the observed values of key labour market indicators
in the U.S economy, such as the average unemployment rate and the rate at
which unemployed workers nd jobs. Moreover, our model can match the
observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment, job vacan-
cies and vacancy-unemployment ratio in response to shocks of a plausible
magnitude. Third, we show that, again using standard values for struc-
2A leading alternative in the literature is strategic wage bargaining, see Hall and Mil-
grom (2008). A shortcoming of strategic wage bargaining is disscussed in the fourth
chapter of the thesis.
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tural parameters, our model outforms the standard DMP model in terms
of capturing some dynamic features of the U.S labour market, such as the
correlation and autocorrelation of key labour market indicators.
Finally, we also extend results in the existing e¢ ciency wage literature.
Our model simplies to a standard e¢ ciency wage model if job matching is
perfect. Wage-setting is characterised by an extension of the Solow (1979)
condition to allow for the dynamics of the labour market and the e¤ects
of imperfect matching. In the e¢ ciency wage model, the productivity of
workers depends on the wage paid to workers relative to a reference wage.
The existing literature assumes ad-hoc functions for the reference wage that
reect current wages and unemployment. As discussed earlier, one of the
reference wages in our model takes a more search theoretic approach by
relating the reference wage to the forward-looking value functions associated
with being unemployed. This search-theoretic microfounded reference wage
lls the gap between e¢ ciency wage theory and search theory.
Currently, the strategic bargaining approach is the most prominent re-
sponse to the unemployment volatility puzzle (Mortensen and Nagypal,
2007, Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Christiano et al, 2016). Notwithstanding
this, there are issues with the strategic bargaining approach.The approach
assumes that the threat point in wage bargaining is delay rather than break-
up of the match and that the rm incurs a xed cost of delay and the worker
enjoys leisure in the event of disagreement in a bargaining round. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2016) stress the models reliance of a large calibrated cost of
delay. These threat points are acyclical and so result in the wage being
less cyclically sensitive than in simple Nash bargaining. Since there is no
production until agreement is reached, it might be argued that the cost of
delay to the rm should be seen as pro-cyclical, reecting lost output, rather
than xed. If so, the threat point becomes more pro-cyclical and so does the
resulting wage. Other litrature in this eld solves the puzzle by diminish-
ing the rmsprots. For example, Hagedorn and Mankovskii (2008) raise
the value of utility of leisure; Pissarides (2009) introduces a xed cost of
matching in addition to costs of posting vacancies and Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2013) introduce credit frictions. In the literature, the particular
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weakness of the search frictions model in explaining vacancies has received
less attention.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We outline the
model in section 2) explaining the objectives and constraints of households
and rms and explaining job matching and labour market ows. Then we
characterise the model by deriving the optimality conditions for employment




There is a continuum of identical individuals on the unit interval. Each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour in every period and con-
sumes all the income they earn. An individual is either employed and earning
a wage w, or else unemployed and earning real unemployment benets b. If
unemployed, an individual nds a job with probability ft. At the end of each
period, existing job matches are exogenously terminated with probability  t.
We assume  t = "t where "

t is a separation shock. Since we assume that
all rms are identical, the value of being employed is thus
Lt = wt + Et[(1   t)Lt+1 +  tUt+1] (1.1)
where  is the discount factor. We dene that  = 1=(1 + r) where r is
the real discount rate. The value of being unemployed is
Ut = b+ Et[ftLt+1 + (1  ft)Ut+1] (1.2)
2.1.1 The Fair Level of E¤ort
If employed, individuals exert what they regard as the "fair" level of
e¤ort. We assume that the fair level of e¤ort depends on the proportional
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gap between the wage and a reference wage. Following Summers (1988), the
fair level of e¤ort at rm i is given by




for wit > wit and 0 <  < 1, where wit is the real product wage of rm
i and w is the real reference wage. The specication of the real reference
wage will be discussed later. We dene the elasticity of e¤ort with respect




. Given equation (1.3),





wit   wit (1.4)
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm
can hire up to one worker who produces an amount Ate"A;t where At is total
factor productivity (we assume A = 1 in equilibrium). The value of a lled
job is
Jt = Atet   wt + Et[(1   t)Jt+1 +  tVt+1] (2.1)
where V is the value of a vacancy. Firms must pay a real per-period
cost of 0 at the start of each period to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then
lled with probability qt; if the vacancy is lled, the new job match becomes
productive in the following period. The value of an open vacancy is then
Vt =  0 + Et[qt+1Jt+1 + (1  qt+1)Vt+1] (2.2)
2.3 The Labour Market
Employment evolves according to
Nit = (1   t)Nit 1 + hit (3.1)
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where hi;t is the number of workers hired and  t is the exogenous job sep-
aration rate. The labour market is characterised by search frictions and so
rms must post vacancies in order to hire workers. Aggregate hiring is deter-
mined by the matching function ht = M(ut; vt) whereM 0(:) > 0,M 00(:)  0,
h are aggregate hires, u is the number of job seekers and v are aggregate
vacancies. We assume the matching function has constant returns to scale,




= M(utvt ), where
M(uv ) = M(
u
v ; 1). We dene the vacancy lling rate
for rm i as qit = hitvit . We assume that the number of workers hired by rm
i is proportional to the relative number of vacancies it posts, so hit = vitvt ht:
As a result, qit = qt and so the vacancy lling rate is exogenous at the level
of rm3. We assume that the real unit cost of posting a vacancy is constant.
To proceed, We assume that the matching function has the Cobb-Douglas
form ht = mut v
1 
t . Dening  =
v















2.4 Optimal Wages and Employment





3We follow the literature and assume that rms seek to hire in every period.
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Substituting (4.1) into (2.1), we obtain the job creation condition
Atet   wt   t = 0 (4.2)
where t = fAtqt   (1   )Et
At+1
qt+1
g is the real cost of hiring a worker
( = 0=). Equation (4.2) determines labour demand by equating the
marginal product of labour to itsmarginal cost. The wage that maximises
the value of a lled job in (2.1) is
Atewt = 1 (4.3)
where ewt is the derivative of the e¤ort function with respect to the wage.
Dividing (4.3) by (4.2), we obtain







At the optimum, the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the wage equals
the ratio of the wage to the present value of the marginal cost of a new hire.
Combining Proposition 1) with equation (1.4), we obtain






The wage has two distinct components. The rst is a pure e¢ ciency
wage e¤ect in which the wage is a mark-up over the reference wage, where
the mark-up reects the strength of e¢ ciency wages. The second reects
labour market frictions as the worker receives a proportion of hiring costs,
where this proportion also reects the strength of e¢ ciency wage e¤ects. This
wage equation reects an interaction between search frictions and e¢ ciency
wage e¤ects. For example, an increase in the cost of posting a vacancy ()
increases it and implies reduced employment and increased wages, leading
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to increased e¤ort. Therefore search frictions a¤ect the optimal composition
of e¤ective labour.
The wage equation in (4.5) has interesting parallels with wage equations
derived in models with search frictions e.g. Pissarides (2000). In both, the
wage is an increasing function of search costs, but for di¤erent reasons. In
a search frictions model, higher search costs increase the surplus from a
job match. Since the wage bargain divides this surplus between workers
and the rm, this is reected in a higher wage4. In a model with search
frictions and e¢ ciency wages, by contrast, higher search costs induce rms
to adjust the composition of e¤ective labour by increasing e¤ort and reducing
employment, something that requires an increase in the wage. In (4.5), the
wage also depends on e¢ ciency wages; this e¤ect is not present in the search
frictions literature.
Propositions 1) and 2) extend results in the existing e¢ ciency wage litera-
ture. The expression in (4.4) simplies to the original Solow (1979) condition
if there are no search costs. The rst term in the wage equation in (4.5) is
similar to expressions in Summers (1988) and Romer (2011). The second
term in (4.5) extends these by adding a component that reects labour mar-
ket search5. Following Solow (1979), we can interpret these results as the
outcome of minimization of the cost of e¤ective labour. In this model, the









) = 1 (4.7)
from which we can derive the modied Solow Condition in Proposition 1).
2.5 Specication of the Reference Wage
4 In a search frictions model, the surplus also reects the value of employment to a
worker. This aspect is irrelevant in this paper as the rm chooses the wage unilaterally.
5 if there are no search costs, (4.5) simplies to equation (10.15) in Romer (2011)
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We consider two modelling approaches to the reference wage. One follows
the literature in e¢ ciency wages; the other one is based on search theory.
2.5.1 Social Norms and Fair Wages
The e¢ ciency wage literature contains alternative specications of the
reference wage. Some refer to social norms; this is discussed by Katz (1986)
who comments that "Akerlof (1982, 1984) and Solow (1979) argue that wage
rigidity in the face of unemployment may be due to the importance of social
wage norms". Other refer to a "gift exchange", eg Akerlof (1984), in which
workers expect a "fair wage" from their employers. To capture these ideas,




The social norm approach might suggest that the reservation wage is inde-
pendent of the business cycle, in which case  = 0; the "fair wage" approach
might imply  > 0 so workers expect a positive technology shock to be re-
ected in higher wages6. The parameter  is a positive constant and   1;
it measures the reference compensation level which workers feel well treated
by their employer.









As stated above, when workers face a job o¤er, they either accept the job
o¤er and receive the wage set by the rm or reject the job o¤er and stay
6The reference wage (4.8) is similar to the wage determination in Blanchard and Gali
(2010) and Michaillat (2012).
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in the unemployment pool. To ensure that workers accept the wage o¤er,
the ow value of being employed should be larger than the ow value of
being unemployed. Following this idea, We dene the reference wage as the
















In steady-state, wR is the reservation wage, the wage at which L = U .
Substitute the reservation wage into (1.1),
L  U = 1 + r
r + 














is proportional to L UU , so e¤ort reects the value
of employment relative to unemployment. Combining (4.10) and (4.12) with
(1.2), we obtain
wR = b+ (1  )w (4.21)
where  = r+r++f . Hence the steady-state wage with this reference wage is
w = b+

    (b+ ) (4.22)
2.6 Summary of Key Equations
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We summarize the model as follows. Two endogenous variables, the wage
and labour market tightness, are determined by the wage equation (4.9)
(or (4.11)) and the job creation condition (4.2). We pin down employment
using the dynamic equation for employment (3.1). This makes our model
comparable to the standard search and matching model. The only di¤erence
between the two is the production function and the wage specication. The
model in this paper assumes output depends on workerse¤ort and rms set
e¢ ciency wages to minimize the cost of e¤ective labour. Output in the stan-
dard search and matching model is exogenous and the wage is determined
by Nash bargaining between the rm and the worker. Later in this chap-
ter we use simulations to assess whether, using wage equations implied by
e¢ ciency wages, the search and matching model can replicate the observed
business-cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in
response to shocks of a plausible magnitude.
The key equations of the model include policy functions for job creation and
the optimal wage, the specication for the reference wage and the equations
for key labour market variables fet; nt; ut; ht; qt; ft; tg. These equations are
listed below:
Job creation condition,
Atet   wt   t = 0 (5.1)






The cost of hiring a worker,
t = f 1
qt









The dynamic equation for employment,
nt = (1   t 1)nt 1 + ht (5.5)
The denition of unemployment,

















ft = tqt (5.10)









The value function for being employed,
Lt = wt + Et[(1   t+1)Lt+1 +  t+1Ut+1] (5.13)
The value function for being unemployed,
Ut = b+ Et[ftLt+1 + (1  ft)Ut+1] (5.14)
2.6.1 Linearised Model
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We obtain a linear approximation around the steady-state using a rst-
order Taylor series expansion. Details are contained in the appendix. Letbxt denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its steady state
and let "Xt denote the shock to variable Xt. Then the linearized form of the
key equations are:
bet + "At = !1 bwt + (1  !1)bt (5.15)
bwt = h1cwt + (1  h1)bt (5.16)bt =  1bqt + (1  1)bqt+1 + 2"t (5.17)
bet =  w
w   w ( bwt  cwt) (5.18)
bnt = (1  )bnt 1 +  bht   "t 1 (5.19)
but =  n
1  n bnt (5.20)bht = but + (1  )bvt (5.21)bt = bvt   but (5.22)
bqt =  bt (5.23)bft = bt + bqt (5.24)dwtS = "At (5.25)dwtR = bUt (5.26)cLt = a1 bwt + a2bLt+1 + (1  a1   a2)bUt+1 + a3"t+1 (5.27)cUt = b1bLt+1 + b2 bUt+1 + b3 bft (5.28)
where !1 = ww+ , h1 =
wr
wr+
, 1 = 11 (1 ) , 2 =





a2 = (1  ), a3 = (U L)L , b1 =
fL
U




We calibrate the two models using established parameter values from the
literature. These are summarised in Table 1. We normalize a time period
to be one quarter, and set the risk-free interest rate to r = 0:012, equivalent
to an annual risk-free interest rate of 0.048 (Shimer, 2005). Therefore the
discount factor  is set to equal to 0:988: Following Shimer (2005) and Hall
(2005), the job separation rate is set as  = 0:1, so on average 3.3 precent
of employed workers exit employment evey month. There is no consensus
in literature on the calibrated values of the cost of posting a vacancy  and
the utility of leisure b. In the third chapter of this thesis, we argue that
larger values of vacancy costs and the utility of leisure can both generate
larger unemployment uctuations. Since our goal is to evaluate the role
of e¢ ciency wage in solving unemployment volatility puzzle, we adopt the
lower value of the vacancy cost and the utility of leisure in the literature.
Following Shimer (2005), we assume the vacancy cost  is 0:213 and the
utility of leisure b is 0.4. We set the elasticity of matching with respect
to unemployment  equal to 0.5, a standard value in search literature, see
Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001).
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Table 1 Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Social Norm Reservation
and Fair Wage Wage
 Exogenous Separation 0:1 0:1
Rate
 Discount Factor 0:988 0:988
r Risk-Free Interest Rate 0:012 0:012
b Utility of Leisure 0:4 0:4
 Vacancy Cost 0:213 0:213
 Elasticity of E¤ort 0:030 0:031
m Matching Coe¢ cient 1:31 0:9
 Matching Elasticity 0:5 0:5
 Coe¢ cient of the 0:8 
Reference Wage
 Wage Elasticity 0:5 
There are no established values of ; m;  and  in the literature. We
therefore set these so that both models match the average unemployment
rate in the US, 5.8% (from BLS data:1948Q1 to 2014Q4), and average job
nding rate of 0.55 per month (see Hagedorn and Mankoskii 2008). Doing
so we obtained  = 0:031 and m = 0:9 in the reservation wage model. For
the model with social norm and fair wage, we set  = 0:03, m = 1:31, and
 = 0:8. The implied equilibrium unemployment rate and the job nding
rate in both models are pretty close to the target, see Table 2. The value of
wage elasticity with respect to productivity  is set to equal to 0.5, so the
reference wage lies somewhere between the pure social norm and the pure
fair wage extremes.
Table 2 Average Values of Endogenous Variables from Calibrations
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data Social Norm Reservation
and Fair Wage Wage
u Unemployment Rate 0:058 0:058 0:059
 Labour Market Tightness 0:63 1:0
f Job Finding Rate 0:55 0:54 0:53
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We assume the shocks to labour productivity and job separation follow
AR(1) process,








We set  = 0:878, s.d (A) = 0:01, and ' = 0:733, s.d ( ) = 0:05, so both
the quarterly autocorrelation and standard deviation of labour productivity
and job separation match U.S data, see Table 3.
Table 3 Statistics of Labour Productivity and Job Separation
Statistics Labour Job
Productivity Separation
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.878 0.733
Standard Deviation 0.020 0.075
Data Source: Shimer(2005), U.S monthly data, 1951-2003
3.2 Simulation Results
3.2.1 Volatility of Key Labour Market Variables
Table 4 describes the standard deviations of key labour market variables
from U.S data and simulation results of three types of search and matching
models. The results in the second and the third column are from Shimer
(2005). The data source for the second column is U.S monthly data from
1951 to 2003, for details see pp.27-34 of Shimer (2005).
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Table 4 Labour Productivity and Separation Shocks
Standard Deviation U.S Data Standard DMP Social Norm Reservation
of Key Labour Shimer Shimer and Wage
Market Variables (2005) (2005) Fair Wage
y Output 0.020 0.020 0:020 0:020
s Job Separation 0.075 0.020 0.075 0.075
u Unemployment Rate 0.190 0.031 0:196 0:181
v Vacancy Rate 0.202 0.011 0:202 0:211
 Market Tightness 0.382 0.037 0:373 0:365
f Job Finding rate 0.118 0.014 0:186 0:183
w Wage   0:021 0:002
The standard DMP column reports Shimer (2005)s ndings that the stan-
dard DMP model produces too little volatility of unemployment from real-
istic uctuations in productivity and job separation. Comparing Shimers
reports in the third column in Table 4 and the second column in Table
5 in which only labour productivity shock is considered, we nd that the
separation shock has only a trivial e¤ect on the volatility of labour market
tightness.
The last two columns of Table 4 show that the two types of search and
matching model with e¢ ciency wages can match the observed amount of
volatility of unemployment, vacancy and labour market tightness well. In
both models, the standard deviation of labour market tightness is almost 20
times as large as the standard deviation of average labour productivity. The
standard deviation of unemployment and job vacancies are about 10 times
as large as the standard deviation of average labour productivity. All those
results are consistent with U.S data. The job nding rate in both models is
more volatile than what the data indicates. This is probably because under
the assumption of exogenous job separation, the separation shock generates a
positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies, leading to labour
market tightness being almost unchanged. Therefore the volatility of labour
market tightness almost entirely relies on the uctuations of job creation.
In both models, the wage is much less volatile than the unemployment rate.
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One might be concerned that the joint analysis of labour productivity
and separation shocks may not say too much about the role of productivity
shocks in unemployment and vacancies volatility. Next we carry out the
simulation with only productivity shock. Results are reported in Table 5.
In the absense of the shock to job separations, the decrease in the standard
deviation of unemployment, job vacancies and labour market tightness in
both models is trivial. This implies that the productivity shock is the major
driving force behind labour market volatility.
Table 5 Labour Productivity Shocks
Standard Deviation Standard DMP Social Norm Reservation
of Key Labour Shimer and Wage
Market Variables (2005) Fair Wage
y Output 0.020 0:020 0:020
u Unemployment Rate 0.009 0:174 0:163
v Vacancy Rate 0.027 0:196 0:204
 Market Tightness 0.035 0:370 0:363
f Job Finding rate 0.01 0:185 0:181
w Wage  0:021 0:002
3.2.2 Variance Decomposition
Table 6 shows the variance decomposition of key labour market variables
when the labour productivity shock and job separation shock are both taken
into account. In both models, the separation shock plays a non-trivial role
in terms of generating unemployment volatility. However for each labour
market variable the productivity shock is unarguably the major driving force
of their volatility.
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Table 6 Variance Decomposition
Key Labour Productivity Shock Separation Shock
Market Variables Social Norm Reservation Social Norm Reservation
and Fair Wage Wage and Fair Wage Wage
u Unemployment Rate 79.31 80.82 20:61 19:18
v Vacancy Rate 94.52 93.55 5:48 6:45
 Market Tightness 98.75 98.73 1:25 1:27
f Job Finding rate 98.75 98.73 1:25 1:27
w Wage 100.00 99.42 0:00 0:58
3.2.3 Autocorrelation and Cross Correlations
The two models in the paper also outperform the standard DMP model in
terms of replicating the autocorrelation of job vacancies and the correlations
between unemployment, job vacancies, labour market tightness and the job
nding rate.
The rst column of the Table 7 shows the quarterly autocorrelations of key
labour market variables observed in the data. The second column reports
the same statistics obtained by simulating the standard DMP model. The
quarterly autocorrelation of job vacancies in DMP model is less than one
third of its counterpart in the data. By contrast, the same autocorrelations
in our two models are much closer to the data. This might suggest that our
models can better capture the dynamics of job creation.
Table 7 Quarterly Autocorrelation of Key Labour Market Variables
Key Labour U.S Data Standard DMP Social Norm Reservation
Market Variables Shimer (2005) Shimer (2005) and Fair Wage Wage
u Unemployment Rate 0.936 0.933 0.848 0.930
v Vacancy Rate 0.940 0.291 0.870 0.800
 Market Tightness 0.941 0.878 0.876 0.876
f Job Finding rate 0.908 0.878 0.876 0.876
y Output 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878
s Job Separation 0.733 0.878 0.733 0.733
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Table 8 shows the correlation matrix of key labour market variables
in each model. U.S data indicates the correlation between unemployment
and job vacancies is -0.894, so the two variables are strongly negatively
correlated. However the standard DMP model cannot capture this feature,
the correlation between two variables in the DMP model is only -0.427. Our
two models do a better job on this. The correlations between unemployment
and job vacancies in the social norms and fair wages model is -0.76 and in
the reservation wage model is -0.73. The standard DMP model also cannot
capture the observed correlation between job vacancies and labour market
tightness and the observed correlation between job vacancies and job nding
rate. Here again, our two models outperform the standard DMPmodel. This
reects the fact that our search models with e¢ ciency wages better capture
labour market dynamics.
Table 8 Matrix of Correlation of Key Labour Market Variables
u v  f
U.S Data u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949
Standard DMP u 1 -0.427 -0.964 -0.964
Fair Wage u 1 -0.760 -0.936 -0.936
Reservation Wage u 1 -0.730 -0.919 -0.919
U.S Data v  1 0.975 0.897
Standard DMP v  1 0.650 0.650
Fair Wage v  1 0.940 0.940
Reservation Wage v  1 0.941 0.941
U.S Data    1 0.948
Standard DMP    1 1
Fair Wage    1 1
Reservation Wage    1 1
U.S Data f    1
Standard DMP f    1
Fair Wage f    1
Reservation Wage f    1
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4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have added a Solow-type e¢ ciency wage e¤ect to
an otherwise standard search frictions model. We have derived a simple
generalisation of the Solow Condition, which we used to express the wage as
the sum of components reecting search frictions and e¢ ciency wages. We
found that this alternative type of search frictions model delivers the same
unemployment and job vacancies uctuations as in U.S data. We also found
that the models capture the labour market dynamics well.
We would argue that our results are interesting but not denitive. We
would wish to develop our work, in two main directions. First, we have
replaced wage bargaining with e¢ ciency wages; the logical next step is to
combine both in the same model and analyse interactions between them.
Second, a natural extension of our work would analyse the e¤ect of the
aggregate demand on unemployment and job vacancies uctuations in a
general equilibrium set-up. We hope to address these issues in future work.
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
The Linear Approximation
The Job Creation Condition
Atet = wt + t
First, take the natural log on both sides of job creation condition,
lnAt + ln et = ln(wt + t)
then rewrite the job creation condition by replacing each variable with its
rst-order taylor series expansion around the steady state:
"At + ln e+
1
e
(et   e) = ln(w + ) + 1
w + 
(wt   w) + 1
w + 
(t   )




(et   e) = 1
w + 
(wt   w) + 1
w + 
(t   )
let bxt denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its steady
state, rewrite the above equation as










































since lnw = ln( 11 w
r + 1 ), it follows that
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Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
bwt = wr
wr + 





  (1   t)Et 1
qt+1
]
Take the natural log on both sides of equation
lnt = ln  + ln[
1
qt
  (1   t)Et 1
qt+1
]
























( t   )
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since ln = ln  + ln[1q   (1  )1q ], it follows that
1

(t   ) = q
1  (1  ) [
 1
q2
(qt   q) + (1  )
q2
(qt+1   q) + 
q
( t   )]
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
bt =  1






Take the natural log on both sides of equation





















since ln e =  ln(w ww ), it follows that
1
e









Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
bet =  w
w   wr ( bwt   cwrt )
The dynamic equation for employment
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nt = (1   t 1)nt 1 + ht
One can write this as
lnnt = ln[(1   t 1)nt 1 + ht]












since lnn = ln[(1  )n+ h], we have
1
n
(nt   n) = 1  
n
(nt 1   n) +  n
n
( t 1   ) + 1
n
(ht   h)
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
bnt = (1  )bnt 1 +  bht   "t 1
The denition of unemployment
ut = 1  nt
Take the natural log on both sides of equation
lnut = ln(1  nt)





(ut   u) = ln(1  n) +  1
1  n(nt   n)
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since lnu = ln(1  n), it follows that
1
u
(ut   u) =  1
1  n(nt   n)
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its








Take the natural log on both sides of equation
lnht = lnm+  lnut + (1  ) ln vt





(ht h) = lnm+ lnu+1
u
(ut u) + (1 ) ln v+ (1 )1
v
(vt v)
since lnh = lnm+  lnu+ (1  ) ln v, we have
1
h
(ht   h) = 1
u
(ut   u) + (1  )1
v
(vt   v)
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
bht = but + (1  )bvt




Take the natural log on both sides of equation and replace each variable
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(t   ) = ln v + 1
v
(vt   v)  lnu  1
u
(ut   u)
Rearrange the equation and use bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a
variable Xt around its steady state,





Take the natural log on both sides of equation and replace each variable




(qt   q) = lnm   ln    1

(t   )
Rearrange the equation and use bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a




Take the natural log on both sides of equation and replace each variable




(ft   f) = ln  + 1

(t   ) + ln q + 1
q
(qt   q)
Rearrange the equation and use bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a
variable Xt around its steady state,
bft = bt + bqt
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Take the natural log on both sides of equation and replace each variable




(wt   w) = ln  + "At
Rearrange the equation and use bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a
variable Xt around its steady state,
cwt = "At





Take the natural log on both sides of equation and replace each variable










Rearrange the equation and use bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a
variable Xt around its steady state,
cwt = bUt
The value function for being employed
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Lt = wt + Et[(1   t+1)Lt+1 +  t+1Ut+1]
Take the natural log on both sides of equation
lnLt = lnfwt + Et[(1   t+1)Lt+1 +  t+1Ut+1]g





(Lt   L) = lnfw + [(1  )L+ U ]g+ (U   L)
L




(Lt+1   L) + 
L
(Ut+1   U) + 1
L
(wt   w)
since lnL = lnfw + [(1  )L+ U ]g, it follows that
1
L









Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
cLt = w
L
bwt + (1  )bLt+1 + U
L
bUt+1 + (U   L)
L
"t+1
The value function for being unemployed
Ut = b+ Et[ftLt+1 + (1  ft)Ut+1]
Take the natural log on both sides of equation
lnUt = lnfb+ Et[ftLt+1 + (1  ft)Ut+1]g










(ft   f) + f
U
(Lt+1   L) + (1  f)
U
(Ut+1   U)
since lnU = lnfb+ [fL+ (1  f)U ]g, we have
1
U
(Ut   U) = (L  U)
U
(ft   f) + f
U
(Lt+1   L) + (1  f)
U
(Ut+1   U)
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its
steady state, this becomes
cUt = fL
U








This chapter analyses labour market volatility in a model that adds a
Shapiro-Stiglitz type e¢ ciency wage to an otherwise standard search and
matching frictions model of the labour market. In this model, rms set an
e¢ ciency wage to deter workers from shirking. Our analysis indicates that
the wage is less responsive to productivity shocks than with Nash bargained
wages. We argue that our model outperfoms the standard search frictions
model in two key aspects: (i) our model can match the observed business-
cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment and job vacancies; (ii) our
model also better captures labour market dynamics.
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1 Introduction
There are two broad types of e¢ ciency wage model. Following Solow
(1979) and Summers (1988), one type of model assumes that e¤ort is a
continuous variable. The implication of this type of e¢ ciency wage model
on the labour market volatility has been discussed in the previous chapter.
The other, following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) assumes that e¤ort is binary,
corresponding to a worker choosing to shirk or not. This chapter explores
the implications of this alternative type of e¢ ciency wage on labour market
volatility.
There is a small existing literature that does this. Uhlig and Xu (1996)
incorporate the shirking mechanism into a real business cycle (RBC) model.
They argue that the shirking mechanism can explain the observed volatility
of labour input only if productivity shocks are implausibly large. Gomme
(1999) explores wage behavior in a RBC-type model with a shirking mecha-
nism which assumes that shirking workers are always detected and dismissed.
This paper concludes that a shirking mechanism can generate dampened but
still strongly procyclical wage behavior. Alexopoulos (2006) incorporates a
shirking mechanism into a limited participation DSGE model in which rms
pay workers part of their wage upfront and do not pay the balance to work-
ers who are detected as shirkers. Using this wage deferment process, the
model is able to capture the observed response of macro-variables includ-
ing employment to monetary policy shocks. None of these models explores
the unemployment volatility puzzle. Also none of them includes search and
matching frictions.
In this paper we incorporate the shirking mechanism developed by Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) into an otherwise standard search and matching model
and use this to address the volatility puzzle. To the best of our knowledge,
no other paper does this. As in the rst chapter we consider the inuential
paper by Shimer (2005), who documents the inability of simulations of a
parameterized version of the standard DMP model where wages are deter-
mined through wage bargaining to match the volatilities of unemployment,
job vacancies, and labour market tightness in US data for 1951-2003. We
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consider whether our alternative model, calibrated to match the average
unemployment rate and job nding rate in the U.S, can better capture the
observed labour market volatilities.
The paper has three contributions. First, we develop a simple analytical
model by adding the shirking mechanism to an otherwise standard search
frictions model. The wage in our model shares some determinants with the
standard DMP model: the utility of leisure, the rate at which job matches
are disolved and the job nding rate. However we nd that the wage elas-
ticity with respect to labour productivity has rather di¤erent determinants
in the two models. In the standard DMP model, the wage responds to pro-
ductivity shocks for two reasons. One is that productivity a¤ects the wage
level directly since productivity a¤ects the size of match surplus. The other
one is the response of labour market tightness to a productivity shock. A
positive productivity shock makes job creation more appealing to rms. So
more job vacancies are posted. This pulls down the unemployment rate and
increases labour market tightness. The increase in labour market tightness
shortens unemployment duration, raising the value of being unemployed to
the worker, and therefore raising workers threat point in wage bargaining.
In our model, by contrast, the wage responds to a productivity shock if and
only if the job nding rate responds to productivity. If the job nding rate
increases after a positive productivity shock, then the relative value of being
unemployed to a worker also increases. This reduces the potential loss of
being red if the worker chooses to shirk since it becomes easier to nd a
new job. As a result, the rm has to raise the wage to increase the threat
point faced by workers.
Empirical evidence shows that the job nding rate is less variable than
labour market tightness under productivity shocks. The search frictions
model captures this fact when a constant return to scale of matching pro-
cess is assumed. Therefore, with reasonable calibrations, the wage in our
model exhibits smaller variations than Nash bargained wage and this helps
our model to capture the observed uctuations of unemployment and job
vacancies.
Second, using standard values for the structural parameters, we show
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that our model can match the observed value of key labour market indica-
tors in the U.S economy, such as the average unemployment rate and the
rates at which unemployed workers nd jobs. Moreover, our model can gen-
erate the observed business-cycle-frequency uctuations in unemployment,
job vacancies and the vacancy-unemployment ratio in response to shocks of
a plausible magnitude. Third, we show that, again using standard values
for structural parameters, our model outforms the standard DMP model in
terms of capturing some dynamic features of the U.S labour market, such
as the correlations and autocorrelation of key labour market indicators.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We outline the model
in section 2) explaining the objectives of workers and rms and explaining
job matching and labour market ows. Then we characterise the model
by deriving the optimality conditions for vacancy creations and wages. In
section 3) we calibrate and simulate the model. Section 4) concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Workers
There is a continuum of identical workers on the unit interval, all of
whom dislike putting forth e¤ort, but enjoy consuming goods. Each worker
inelastically supplies one unit of labour in every period and consumes all the
income they earn. We write an individuals utility function as wt   e   ,
where wt is the wage received and  is the utility of leisure7 and e is the
disutility of e¤ort. For simplicity, we assume that workers can provide either
no e¤ort (in this case e = 0)8, or some xed positive level of e¤ort which
leads to e = 1.
In period t a worker is in one of three states. If they are employed and
not shirking, they earn a wage wt but incur disutility of e¤ort of e. If they
are employed and shirking, they earn the same wage but do not su¤er the
7Workers lose the utility of leisure when going to work, no matter they provide e¤ort
or not.
8Alternatively, we could assume that e¤ort is positive but less than 1 if the worker
shirks. However, this wouldnt a¤ect the no-shirking constraint faced by the rm.
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disutility of e¤ort. If they are unemployed, they earn real unemployment
benets b. If unemployed, an individual nds a job with probability ft.
Therefore the expected length of the unemployment spell an individual must
face is 1=ft.
At the end of each period, existing job matches exogenously separate
with probability  t. The separation rate is stochastic:  t = e"

t where "t
is a separation rate shock and "t = 
"t 1 + t , where t is distributed as
N(0; 2 ). In addition, workers who shirk are detected and dismissed with
probability . Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we also assume that
exogenous job separation and the ring of a shirking worker are two mutually
exclusive events. So when a worker shirks, the probability he leaves the job
is  + .9
The workers choose their e¤ort level to maximize their discounted utility
stream. This involves comparison of the utility from shirking with the utility
from not shirking. The value function for being employed and not shirking
is
Lt = wt   e  + Et[(1   t)Mt+1 +  tUt+1] (2.1)
where  is the discount factor. We assume that  = 1=(1 + r), in which r is
the risk-free real interest rate. We dene Mt as max(Lt; St), in which St is
the value function for being employed and shirking. St is given by
St = wt   + Et[(1   t   )Mt+1 + ( t + )Ut+1] (2.2)
The value of being unemployed is
Ut = b+ Et[ftMt+1 + (1  ft)Ut+1] (2.3)
The worker will choose not to shirk if and only if Lt  St. This is the
so-called no-shirking condition (NSC), which, using (2.1) and (2.2), can be
9An alternative specication is to assume exogenous job separation and action of ring
a shirking worker are two independent events. So when a worker shirks, the probability




Et(Mt+1   Ut+1)  e (2.4)
The intuition behind the NSC is that a worker will choose not to shirk if
and only if the expected discounted loss due to shirking is no less than the
disutility of e¤ort. Equation (2.4) is a discrete time form of the no-shirking
condition in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm
can hire up to one worker who produces an amount At if they do not shirk
and nothing if they do shirk, where At = e"
A
t is total factor productivity;
"At is a technology shock where "
A
t =  "
A
t 1 + At , where At is distributed as
N(0; 2s). The value of a lled job to the rm is
Jt = At   wt + Et[(1   t)Jt+1 +  tVt+1] (2.5)
where V is the value of a vacancy. Firms must pay a real cost of 0 to post
a vacancy. Vacancies are then lled at the start of the next period with
probability q; if the vacancy is lled, the new job match becomes productive
immediately. The value of an open vacancy is then
Vt =  0 + Et[qt+1Jt+1 + (1  qt+1)Vt+1] (2.6)
The value functions (2.5) and (2.6) are di¤erent to Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) in the following respects: (i) rms pay a real cost to post a vacancy;
(ii) the rate of lling a job vacancy is endogenized. Next we turn to charac-
terise the labour market.
2.3 The Labour Market
Employment evolves according to
Nit = (1   t)Nit 1 + hit (2.7)
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where hi;t is the number of workers hired and  t is the exogenous job sepa-
ration rate. We assume  t = "t where "

t is a separation shock. The labour
market is characterised by search frictions and so rms must post vacancies
in order to hire workers. Aggregate hiring is determined by the matching
function ht = M(ut; vt) where M 0(:) > 0, M 00(:)  0, h are aggregate hires,
u is the number of job seekers and v are aggregate vacancies. We assume
the matching function has constant returns to scale, so ht = vtM(utvt ; 1),
hence the aggregate vacancy lling rate qt is given by qt = htVt =
M(utvt ),
where M(uv ) = M(
u




. We assume that the number of workers hired by rm i is pro-
portional to the relative number of vacancies it posts, so hit = vitvt ht: As a
result, qit = qt and so the vacancy lling rate is exogenous at the level of
rm10. We assume that the real unit cost of posting a vacancy is constant.
To proceed, We assume that the matching function has the Cobb-Douglas
form ht = mut v
1 
t . Dening  =
v
















We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium wage and employment
levels. We assume that both unemployment benets (b) and the monitoring
technology () are exogenous to rms. Each individual rm chooses the
optimal wage in each period. According to the no-shirking condition, the
10We follow the literature and assume that rms seek to hire in every period.
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rm chooses the lowest wage at which the worker decides not to shirk. This
implies L = S in every period. Rewriting the NSC, we obtain
e = Et(Lt+1   Ut+1) (2.11)
Using (2.1) and (2.3) we obtain
Et(Lt   Ut) = Et[wt   e    b+ (1   t   ft)(Lt+1   Ut+1)] (2.12)
Combining (2.11) and (2.12), the optimal wage is given by
wt = b+ + e[1 +
1  (1   t   ft)

] (2.13)
Substituting  = 11+r into (2.13), we obtain
wt = b+ + e(1 +
r +  t + ft

) (2.14)
This is equivalent to the no-shirking condition found in the more common
continuous time version of the Shapiro-Stiglitz model. Equilibrium occurs
when each rm, taking as given the job separation rate and job nding rate,
nds it optimal to o¤er the going wage rather than a di¤erent wage. This
wage determination is the same as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Free entry of rms drives rents from vacant jobs to zero. Imposing V = 0





Condition (2.15) states that the expected prot from a new job is equal
to the expected cost of hiring a worker. Substituting condition (2.15) into
(2.5), we obtain
At   wt   t = 0 (2.16)
where t = f 1qt   (1   )Et 1q1+t g is the real cost of hiring a worker ( =
0=). Equation (2.16) determines labour demand by equating the marginal
product of labour to its marginal cost. In equilibrium qt = qt+1. Substitute
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this and  = 11+r into (2.16), we obtain
At   wt   (r +  t)
q()t
= 0 (2.17)
In each period, the number of workers who enter unemployment in each
period is  t(1 ut), and the number who leave unemployment is f()tut. In
equilibrium unemployment is constant, so the two ows are equal,
 t(1  ut) = f()tut (2.18)
substituting this into (2.14), the wage can be rewritten as







2.5 Comparison with the Standard Search and Matching
Model
In the standard search and matching model, workers always put forth
e¤ort. Therefore workers do not shirk and  = 0. Workersutility is wt, as
there is no disutility of e¤ort. The value function for being employed is
Lt = wt + Et[(1   t)Lt+1 +  tUt+1] (2.20)
Workers have the same value function as (2.3) when they are unemployed.
Firms also have the same value functions as (2.5) and (2.6). So the job
match always yields a surplus St, dened as
St = Jt + Lt   Ut (2.21)
The match surplus is split between the rm and the worker according to
Nash bargaining. The wage is chosen to maximize
max(Lt   Ut)J1 t (2.22)
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where  is the workers relative bargaining power. The optimal condition is
Lt   Ut = (Jt + Lt   Ut) (2.23)
Substituting (2.3) and (2.20) into (2.23), we obtain
Lt   Ut = wt     b+ (1   t   ft)Et(Lt+1   Ut+1) (2.24)
The resultant wage is given by





  (1   t   ft) 1
qt+1
] (2.25)
In equilibrium, qt = qt+1. (2.25) becomes
wt = b+ +





Substitute  = 11+r into (2.26),
wt = b+ +








In equilibrium, job creation condition satises




Substituting (2.28) into (2.27), the wage equation now can be written as
wt = (1  )(b+ ) + (At + 0t) (2.29)
This is equivalent to the wage equation in the continuous time version of
the search and matching model, see Pissarides (2000).
2.5.1 Wage Elasticity
The literature argues that a non-trivial response of the wage to labour pro-
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ductivity is a potential reason why the standard DMP model cannot match
the observed uctuations in unemployment and job vacancies, see Shimer
(2005) and Hall (2005). In this section, we show that the wage elasticity
with respect to labour productivity has rather di¤erent determinants in the










where  is the share of wage in output,  = w=A. Expression (2.30) shows
that in our model, the wage responds to a productivity shock if and only
if the job nding rate responds to productivity. If the job nding rate
increases after a positive productivity shock, then the relative value of being
unemployed to a worker also increases. This reduces the potential loss of
being red if the worker chooses to shirk since it becomes easier to nd a
new job. As a result, the rm will raise the wage to re-balance the incentive
that the worker chooses not to shirk.
The extent to which the wage responds to a change in the job nding
rate depends on the disutility of e¤ort and monitoring technology. A lower
disutility of e¤ort or a higher detection rate will lead to a smaller response
of the wage to a change in job nding rate. This is because in both cases
the workers incentive to shirk is lower so the rm does not need to raise the
wage as much.









Expression (2.31) shows that in the standard DMP model, the wage re-
sponds to a productivity shock for two reasons. One is that productivity
a¤ects the wage directly since productivity a¤ects the size of the match
surplus. The other is the response of labour market tightness to the pro-
ductivity shock. A positive productivity shock makes job creation more ap-
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pealing to the rms. So more job vacancies are posted. This pulls down the
unemployment rate and increases labour market tightness. The increase in
labour market tightness shortens unemployment duration, raising the value
of being unemployed to the worker, and therefore raising workers threat
point in wage bargaining.
The extent to which the wage responds to changes in productivity and
labour market tightness depends on the workers bargaining power. A larger
bargaining power implies that the worker will secure a larger share of any
increase in productivity and have a higher threat point in wage bargaining.
Expression (2.31) also says a larger vacancy cost will raise the workers threat
point in wage bargaining. This is because a larger vacancy cost lowers the
rms threat point in wage bargaining since walking away from the wage
negotiation becomes more costly to the rm.
The di¤erent driving forces behind the wage elasticities in (2.30) and (2.31)
make it di¢ cult to say in which model the wage is more volatile. Using
U.S data between 1951 and 2003, Shimer (2005) nds that the standard
deviation of the job nding rate is much smaller than the standard deviation
of labour market tightness. This may suggest the job nding rate is less
responsive to productivity shock than labour market tightness. This nding
is consistent with the implication of constant-return-to-scale of job matching
in the standard DMP model. From (2.10), we have
f = m1  (2.32)




= m(1  )  (2.33)








So the driving force of the wage elasticity in (2.30) is less volatile than in
(2.31). Later we show that, with a reasonable calibration strategy, this helps
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our model better to capture the business cycle features of unemployment and
job vacancies.
2.6 The Elasticity of Labour Market Tightness
Large uctuations of labour market tightness in response to productivity
shocks is a key feature of empirical labour market dynamics. In this section,
we give an analysis of the determinants of the elasticity of labour market
tightness in equilibrium. Combine the wage equation (2.14) and the job
creation condition (2.17) and in steady-state we obtain
b+ + e[1 +






Expression (2.35) determines the equilibrium value of . After implicit
di¤erentiation of (2.35), we obtain the elasticity of labour market tightness
with respect to productivity as
;A =
A
e(1  )f() + (A  w) (2.36)

























[1  ] e q() +  (r+)q()
(2.38)





[1  ] e q() + A w
(2.39)
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e(1  )q() + (A  w) (2.40)




e(1  )f() + (A  w) (2.41)
Expression (2.36) shows the determinants of the elasticity of labour market
tightness. Consider the extreme case where the disutility of e¤ort is zero




In this extreme case, only the gap between output and the wage and the
matching elasticity inuence the elasticity of labour market tightness. The
same result is obtained if Nash wage bargaining in the standard DMP model
is replaced by a Hall-type sticky wage, see Hall (2005) and Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2015).
2.7 Summary of Key Equations
We summarize the key equations of our model as follows. Two endogenous
variables, the wage and labour market tightness, are determined by the
wage equation (2.14) and the job creation condition (2.16). We pin down
employment using the dynamic equation for employment (2.7). This makes
our model comparable to the standard search and matching model. The
only di¤erence between the two is wage determination. The model in this
paper assumes rms choose the wage to avoid shirking. Whereas the wage
is the standard DMP model is determined by Nash bargaining between the
rm and the worker. The key equations are listed below:
Job creation condition,
At   wt   t = 0 (2.43)
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The optimal wage set by the rm,
wt = b+ e(1 +
r +  t + ft

) (2.44)
The cost of hiring a worker,
t = f 1
qt
  (1   t)Et 1
qt+1
g (2.45)
The dynamic equation for employment,
nt = (1   t 1)nt 1 + ht (2.46)
The denition of unemployment,

















ft = tqt (2.51)
2.7.1 Linearised Model
We obtain a linear approximation around the steady state using a rst-
order Taylor series expansion. Details are contained in the appendix. Letbxt denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its steady state
and let "Xt denote the shock to variable Xt. Then the linearized form of the
key equations above are:
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bt =  1bqt + (1  1)bqt+1 + 2"t (2.54)
bnt = (1  )bnt 1 +  bht   "t 1 (2.55)
but =  n
1  n bnt (2.56)bht = but + (1  )bvt (2.57)bt = bvt   but (2.58)
bqt =  bt (2.59)bft = bt + bqt (2.60)
where !1 = ww+ , 1 =
1





Our calibration strategy is summarised in Table 1. We normalize a time
period to be one quarter, and set the risk-free interest rate to r = 0:012,
equivalent to an annual risk-free interest rate of 0.048 (Shimer, 2005). There-
fore the discount factor  is set to equal to 0:988: Following Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005), the job separation rate is set as  = 0:1, so on average
3.3 precent of employed workers exit employment evey month. There is no
consensus in literature on the calibrated values of the cost of posting a va-
cancy  and the utility of leisure b. In the third chapter of this thesis, we
argue that larger values of vacancy costs and the utility of leisure can both
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generate larger unemployment uctuations. Since our goal is to evaluate the
role of e¢ ciency wages in propagating labour market volatility, we adopt the
lower value of the vacancy cost and the utility of leisure in the literature.
Following Shimer (2005), we assume the vacancy cost  is 0:213 and the
utility of leisure b is 0.4. We normalise average productivity to be A = 1.
Table 1 Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Calibrated
Value
 Exogenous Separation 0:1
Rate
 Discount Factor 0:99
r Risk-Free Interest Rate 0:01
A Labour productivity 1
b Unemployment Benet 0:4
 Vacancy Cost 0:213
e Disutility of E¤ort 0:06
 Utility of Leisure 0:43
m Matching Coe¢ cient 2:1
 Matching Elasticity 0:5
 Detection Rate 0:94
We set the matching coe¢ cient to m = 1:355, the same as in Shimer
(2005). The matching elasticity  is set to equal to 0:5, a standard value in
search literature, see Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001).
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing calibrations of the
detection rate and disutility of e¤ort. The value of those two parameters are
chosen so that the model can match the average unemployment in the US,
5.8% (from BLS data:1948Q1 to 2014Q4), and average job nding rate of
0.55 per month (see Hagedorn and Mankoskii 2008). Doing so we obtained
 = 0:945 and e = 0:036. We assume rms only face small monitoring
costs. So the probability of being caught if the worker shirks is 94.5%. The
calibrated value of e suggests that the incentive workers choose to shirk is
very low. We believe this is reasonable since the shirking model assumes
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that workers put forth no e¤ort once they choose to shirk. A high incentive
to shirk will bring a huge welfare loss because rms must raise the wage to
generate a high unemployment rate which leads to a high threat point to
workers. The implied equilibrium unemployment rate and the job nding
rate in our model match average U.S data well, see Table 2.
Table 2 Values of Endogenous Variables for Calibration
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data Our Model
u Unemployment Rate 0:058 0:063
 Labour Market Tightness 0:539 0:504
f Job Finding Rate 0:550 0:497
Note: Unemployment Rate is from BLS data, 1948Q1-2014Q4
Labour Market Tightness is from JOLTS, see Hall (2005)
Job Finding Rate is from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
We assume that shocks to labour productivity and job separation follow
the AR(1) processes,








We set  = 0:878, s.d (A) = 0:01, and ' = 0:733, s.d ( ) = 0:05, so both
the quarterly autocorrelation and standard deviation of labour productivity
and job separation match U.S data, see Table 3.
Table 3 Statistics of Labour Productivity and Job Separation
Statistics Labour Job
Productivity Separation
Quarterly Autocorrelation 0.878 0.733
Standard Deviation 0.020 0.075




In our model, equilibrium unemployment can be decomposed into two
components. One is due to search and matching frictions in the labour
market; the other one is due to the e¢ ciency wage set to avoid shirking.
To decompose unemployment, we set the disutility of e¤ort equal to zero so
workers have no incentive to shirk. In this case, all the unemployment is
frictional unemployment. The results are listed in the Table 4.
Table 4 Unemployment Decomposition




Table 4 shows frictional unemployment only accounts for 12.6% of total
unemployment in our model. This is not surprising since when workers have
no incentive to shirk, rms pay works the lowest wage which amounts to the
utility of leisure. This result, however, does not contradict the implications
of the standard DMP model. Rather they are consistent. In the standard
DMP model, unemployment arises for two reasons. One is search frictions;
the other is the wage premium due to workersbargaining power. Nash wage
bargaining ensures that the real wage exceeds the marginal rate of substi-
tution between consumption and leisure and thus explains the existence of
involuntary unemployment. If workers are assumed to have no bargaining
power, then the wage in the standard DMP model will decrease to the utility
of leisure, the same as in our model. In both models, it is the high wage
that accounts for most of equilibrium unemployment.
3.2.2 Volatility of Key Labour Market Variables
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Table 5 describes the standard deviation of key labour market variables
from U.S data and simulation results of the standard DMP model and our
model. The results in the second and the third column are from Shimer
(2005). The data source for the second column is U.S monthly data from
1951 to 2003, for details see pp.27-34 of Shimer (2005).
Table 5 Labour Productivity and Separation Shocks
Standard Deviation U.S Data Standard DMP Our Model
of Key Labour Shimer Shimer
Market Variables (2005) (2005)
y Output 0.020 0.020 0:020
s Job Separation 0.075 0.020 0.075
u Unemployment Rate 0.190 0.031 0:189
v Vacancy Rate 0.202 0.011 0:204
 Market Tightness 0.382 0.037 0:368
f Job Finding rate 0.118 0.014 0:184
w Wage   0:018
The standard DMP column reports Shimer (2005)s nding that the stan-
dard DMP model produces too little volatility of unemployment from real-
istic uctuations in productivity and job separations. However in Shimers
simulation, the standard deviation of job separations is less than one third
of what the U.S data suggests. Comparing Shimers results in the third
column in Table 5 and the third column in Table 6 in which only labour
productivity shock is considered, we nd that the separation shock has only
a trivial e¤ect on the volatility of labour market tightness.
The last column of Table 5 shows that the search and matching model
with e¢ ciency wages can replicate the observed volatility of unemployment,
vacancy and labour market tightness well. In our model, the standard devi-
ation of labour market tightness is almost 20 times as large as the standard
deviation of average labour productivity. The standard deviation of unem-
ployment and job vacancies are about 10 times as large as the standard
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deviation of average labour productivity. All those results are also consis-
tent with U.S data. The job nding rate in both models is more volatile
than what the data indicates. This is probably because under the assump-
tion of exogenous job separations, the separation shock generates a positive
correlation between unemployment and vacancies, leading to labour market
tightness being almost unchanged. Therefore the volatility of labour market
tightness almost entirely relies on uctuations in job creation. The wage is
much less volatile than unemployment.
One might be concerned that the joint analysis of labour productivity
and separation shocks may not say too much about the role of productivity
shocks in unemployment and vacancy volatility. Next we carry out the
simulation with only the productivity shock. Results are reported in Table
6. In the absence of the shock to job separation, the decrease in standard
deviation of unemployment, job vacancies and labour market tightness in
our model is trivial. This implies that the productivity shock is the driving
force of labour market volatility.
Table 6 Labour Productivity Shocks
Standard Deviation U.S Data Standard DMP Our Model
of Key Labour Model
Market Variables Shimer (2005) Shimer (2005)
y Output 0.020 0.020 0:020
s Job Separation 0.075  
u Unemployment Rate 0.190 0.009 0:172
v Vacancy Rate 0.202 0.027 0:195
 Market Tightness 0.382 0.035 0:367
f Job Finding rate 0.118 0.01 0:184
w Wage   0:018
3.2.3 Explaining the Volatility Results
Since unemployment, vacancies and the job-nding rate can be expressed
as functions of labour market tightness (eg Shimer, 2005), the elasticity of
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labour market tightness with respect to productivity shocks is at the core
of the unemployment volatility puzzle. Considering the steady-state of our
model, we can express the rms optimality condition in (2.17) as
y = w +  (3.3)






































Combining (3.4)-(3.6), we obtain a simple expression for the elasticity of







(1  ) edf + (r+)q
(3.7)
Using our parameter values and the average values of q and f from Table
2), the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the productivity
shock is 17:89. This is close to the ratio of the volatility of labour market
tightness to the volatility of productivity shocks in Table 2).







(1  ) edf + (y   w)
(3.8)
Equation (3.8) shows that our model is able to generate a large volatility
of labour market tightness because of a small rate of prot, (y   w), and
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a small value of ed . This is consistent with arguments in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) that a large volatility of labour market tightness requires
a low rate of prot. Low prots induce rms to put relatively few resources
into recruiting, leading to a low level of labour market tightness and a high
vacancy lling rate. This in turn implies that variations in vacancies in
response to productivity shocks are transmitted strongly into variations in
unemployment.
The comparison with the standard search frictions model is useful here.


























(1  ) (1 ) + (1  b  )
(3.11)
Using the calibrated parameters in Table 1) and following Shimer (2005) in
assuming  = 0:72, the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to
the productivity shock is 4:48; if we follow most of the existing literature
and assume  = 0:5, the elasticity is 1:74. Both values are considerably
smaller than the volatility observed in the data. As noted by Hagedorn
and Makovskii (2008), the standard search frictions model can only match
empirical volatilities by making the implausible assumptions that workers
have very little bargaining power and that the value of leisure is large.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) argue that all proposed solutions to the
unemployment volatility puzzle require a small value for the "fundamental
surplus", the "upper bound on the fraction of a jobs output that the invisible
hand can allocate to vacancy creation"; this is equivalent to the lowest
value of the wage that is consistent with (3.3). Ljungqvist and Sargent









y    (3.12)
where  is the fundamental surplus and y y is the fundamental surplus
share. In our model, the no-shirking constraint gives the lowest wage that
is consistent with positive output, so  = w and so the fundamental surplus
share is simply the rate of prot. We can show that   = (r+)(r+)+(1 ) e
d
fq .
As with (3.11), the low rate of prot in our model generates a large volatility
of labour market tightness. In the standard search frictions model, the
fundamental surplus is  = b+, as this is the lowest value of the wage that is
consistent with non-zero output. In this case,   = (r+)+f(r+)+f . The inability
of the standard search frictions model to address the volatility puzzle is
reected in the relatively small values of   and  obtained by Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2016) using standard calibrations. The value of yy  is only
large enough to generate substantial volatility in  when the value of b+ 
is assumed to be large, following Hagedorn and Makovskii (2008). In the
case of the strategic bargaining model of Hall and Milgrom (2008) (see also
Christiano et al, 2016), the fundamental surplus is  = b +  + (1 )1+r ,
where  is the xed cost of delay incurred by the rm; in this case,   = 1 .
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2016) argue that a large cost of delay is required
to generate a large volatility of labour market tightness.
3.2.4 Variance Decomposition
Table 7 shows the variance decomposition of the key labour market vari-
ables when the labour productivity shock and the job separation shock are
jointly taken into account. In our model, the separation shock plays a non-
trivial role in terms of generating unemployment volatility, which is the same
as in Shimer (2005). However for each labour market variable the produc-
tivity shock is unarguably the major driving force behind their volatilities.
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Table 7 Variance Decomposition
Key Labour Productivity Shock Separation Shock
Market Variables
u Unemployment Rate 82.76 17:24
v Vacancy Rate 91.10 8:90
 Market Tightness 99.77 0:23
f Job Finding rate 99.77 0:23
w Wage 99.96 0:04
3.2.5 Autocorrelation and Cross Correlations
The model in the paper also outperforms the standard DMP model in
terms of replicating the autocorrelation of job vacancies and the correlation
between unemployment, job vacancies, labour market tightness and the job
nding rate.
The rst column of the Table 8 shows the quarterly autocorrelations of key
labour market variables observed in the data. The second column reports
the same statistics obtained by simulating the standard DMP model. The
quarterly autocorrelation of job vacancies in the DMP model is less than one
third of its counterpart in the data. By contrast, the same autocorrelation
in our model is much closer to the data. This might indicate that our models
can better reect the dynamics of job creation.
Table 8 Quarterly Autocorrelation of Key Labour Market Variables
Key Labour U.S Data Standard DMP Our Model
Market Variables Shimer (2005) Shimer (2005)
u Unemployment Rate 0.936 0.933 0.853
v Vacancy Rate 0.940 0.291 0.866
 Market Tightness 0.941 0.878 0.878
f Job Finding rate 0.908 0.878 0.878
y Output 0.878 0.878 0.878
s Job Separation 0.733 0.878 0.733
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Table 9 shows the correlation matrix of key labour market variables
in each model. U.S data indicates the correlation between unemployment
and job vacancies is -0.894, so the two variables are strongly negatively
correlated. However the standard DMP model cannot capture this feature,
the correlation between two variables in the DMP model is only -0.427. Our
model does a better job on this. The correlation between unemployment
and job vacancies in our model is -0.768. The standard DMP model also
cannot capture the observed correlation between job vacancies and labour
market tightness and the observed correlation between job vacancies and job
nding rate. Here, again, our model outperforms the standard DMP model.
This may reect that our search models with e¢ ciency wage better capture
the labour market dynamics.
Table 9 Matrix of Correlation of Key Labour Market Variables
u v  f
U.S Data u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949
Standard DMP u 1 -0.427 -0.964 -0.964
Our Model u 1 -0.744 -0.929 -0.929
U.S Data v  1 0.975 0.897
Standard DMP v  1 0.650 0.650
Our Model v  1 0.939 0.939
U.S Data    1 0.948
Standard DMP    1 1
Our Model    1 1
U.S Data f    1
Standard DMP f    1
Our Model f    1
3.2.5 Impulse Responses
Figure 1 displays the dynamic responses of nine macro variables (employ-
ment, labour market tightness, wage, unemployment, hiring costs, vacancy-
lling rate, job vacancies, job-nding rate and aggregate hires) to an ex-
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ogenous positive productivity shock, using the search frictions model with
e¢ ciency wages. All the responses are in the right direction. The responses
of labour market tightness, unemployment and the job vacancy to the pro-
ductivity shock are larger than the response of the wage to the productivity
shock. This is consistent with our ndings in Table 6.
Figure 2 displays the corresponding responses to an exogenous positive
job separation shock. It shows that both unemployment and job vacancies
increase in response to a higher job separation rate. The increase in unem-
ployment is slightly larger than the increase in job vacancies. This leads to
a small decrease in labour market tightness. Comparing with Figure 1, we
see that the responses to the separation shock are less persistent than to the
productivity shock.
4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have added a standard shirking mechanism to an
otherwise standard search frictions model. We have found that the wage in
our model exhibits relatively little cyclical variation. We also found that this
alternative type of search frictions model can deliver the same unemployment
and job vacancies uctuations as in U.S data. The model also matches labour
market dynamics well.
The ndings in the rst two chapters have interesting implications. We
show that e¢ ciency wage theory can explain why wages are less responsive
to productivity shocks when this hypothesis is incorporated into a dynamic
labour market with search frictions. When a Solow-type e¢ ciency wage
model is considered, the cyclicality of the wage depends on the cyclicality
of the reference wage of workers. We give two alternative ways to dene the
reference wage. One is based on the idea of social norms and fair wages.
The other one is based on the expected return of outside option. In the
second approach, under rational expectations, workers realise that a tempo-
rary technology shock only has a limited e¤ect on the expected return of the
outside option which is measured based on their expected life-time career
path. So unless workers are myopic, workers know even if they successfully
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switch to another job which comes with a higher payment when a positive
productivity shock is observed, such a relatively high payment cannot last
long since the shock is temporary. As a result, they prefer to stay in the
current job to receive a stable income although their employers do not in-
crease the wage much. This microfounded reference wage plays a key role
in delivering the little cyclical variation of the wage.
Another even more microfounded approach has been explored in this
chapter. Based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the wage is chosen to avoid
shirking. A positive productivity shock increases the workers incentive to
shirk if and only if this positive productivity shock can increase the proba-
bility of nding a new job. Empirical evidence shows that job nding rate
is not as volatile as other labour market variables such as labour market
tightness. This provides another way to explain the mild cyclicality of the
wage.
A common nding in the two chapters is that under exogenous job sep-
arations the separation shock generates a positive correlation between un-
employment and vacancies, leading to the labour market tightness being
almost unchanged. Therefore the volatility of labour market tightness al-
most entirely relies on the uctuations of job creation. This is consistent
with Shimer (2005). However given the fact that our three models capture
the volatility of unemployment, job vacancies and labour market tightness
well but the job nding rate is much more volatile than U.S data, we believe
this suggests that job separation might be an important driving force of the
labour market volatility. We turn to this topic in the last chapter of the
thesis.
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
The Linear Approximation
The optimal wage
wt = b+ e(1 +
r +  t + ft

)
One can write this as
lnwt = ln[b+ e(1 +
r +  t + ft

)]










(ft   f) + e
w
( t   )
since lnw = ln[b+ e(1 + r++f )], it follows that
1
w
(wt   w) = e
w
(ft   f) + e
w
( t   )
Using bxt to denote the percentage deviation of a variable Xt around its






See the appendix of the previous chapter for the linear approximation of the
rest of equations.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Key Labour Market Variables to Productivity
Shock
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Key Labour Market Variables to Separation Shock
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Chapter 3
The Two Solutions to the Unemployment
Volatility Puzzle
Abstract
This chapter analyses two proposed solutions to the unemployment volatil-
ity puzzle: sticky wages and a small hiring surplus. We argue that sticky
wages ensures that job vacancies vary with labour productivity and a small
hiring surplusensures any variation of job vacancies is more likely to be
transmitted to variation in unemployment. We point out that a widely used
calibration strategy in the literature raises the relative cost of creating a job
vacancy and increases matching e¢ ciency. We argue that this calibration
strategy is a key factor in generating a large unemployment volatility.
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1 Introduction
The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and matching model
gives an appealing description of how unemployment arises in equilibrium
and what makes it change over time. However, as widely known, the model
is incapable of matching the observed uctuations in unemployment and
job vacancies, which is often referred as the unemployment volatility puzzle.
The early literature argued that this is because the Nash bargained wage
in the DMP model is too exible in the sense that the wage absorbs most
of the productivity changes caused by a shock. The causal chain behind
this argument is straightforward. An increase in labour productivity makes
job creation more appealing to the rms and so more job vacancies are
posted. The increase in job vacancies shortens unemployment duration,
raising the value of being unemployed to the worker. This raises the workers
threat point in wage bargaining. A higher labour productivity also increases
the match surplus, raising the share of the surplus to the worker. Those
two e¤ects lead to higher wages. As a result, wages absorb most of the
productivity increase, eliminating the rmsincentive for vacancy creation.
This argument triggered a wide discussion on modelling alternative wage
regimes11, see for example, Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Ken-
nan (2009), Rudanko (2009), Michaillat (2012) and Rudanko and Krusell
(2015)12. The common feature of those alternative wage regimes is that
the wage is less responsive to labour productivity changes. We refer this
common feature as the sticky wagein the following discussion.13
The literature also discusses alternative scenarios on the unemployment
11As emphasized by Hall (2005), an existing rm-worker pair will be privately e¢ cient
so long as it generates a positive surplus to both parties involved. Any wage path that
can guarantee this private e¢ ciency is consistent with equilibrium.
12The literature also incorporates the DMP framework with sticky wages into the DSGE
model to study the e¤ect of the productivity shocks on unemployment, see Gertler, Sala
and Trigari (2008), Thomas (2008), Gali (2011) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt
(2015).
13We argue that the Nash bargained wage also displays some stickness since the wage
cannot absorb all of the productivity change unless the worker has full bargaining power.
However in that case, there will be no hire.
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volatility puzzle. For example, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) contro-
versially raise the value of leisure when they calibrate the standard DMP
model; Pissarides (2009) introduces xed matching costs to the DMP model;
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) embed credit frictions into the DMP
model.
We point out a common channel behind those alternative scenarios. This
common channel works through a high rate of lling a vacancy. A high
rate of lling a vacancy makes any newly posted vacancy due to a positive
productivity shock more likely to be lled and makes any reduction of job
vacancies due to a negative productivity shock more likely to be transmitted
to job losses. This generates larger uctuations in unemployment. We argue
that to acheive a high vacancy-lling rate, those scenarios diminish the rms
benet from hiring a worker14. This leads to low incentives for vacancy
creation and causes increased slack in the labour market, which in turn
shortens the duration of a vacancy and increases the vacancy-lling rate. We
refer to this common channel as the small hiring surplusin the following
discussion.
We argue that the sticky wage and the small hiring surplusact as comple-
ments rather than substitutes. The sticky wage ensures that job vacancies
vary with labour productivity. The small hiring surplusensures that any
variation in job vacancies is more likely to be transmitted to variation in
unemployment.
The points we have made so far are also a critical response to a recent
paper by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015). They dene the upper bound
of resources available for vacancy creation as the fundamental surplusfor
the rm. And they argue that a small fundamental surplusis the single
common channelto solve the unemployment volatility puzzle.
Our argument is di¤erent to the small fundamental surplusin the follow-
ing respects. First, we believe that the sticky wage is a distinct channel and
a necessary condition for generating unemployment uctuations. Whereas
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) didnt highlight the role of sticky wage in
14 In standard DMP model, each rm hires one worker. So the benet and the marginal
benet of hiring a worker are the same.
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generating unemployment uctuations. Rather, they simply argue that a
low elasticity of the wage with respect to productivityis neither a neces-
sary nor a su¢ cient condition. We agree that a low wage elasticity is not a
necessary condition for generating unemployment uctuations. However the
wage has to display some stickiness in the sense that the wage cannot absorb
all the productivity change. Suppose a wage regime allows the wage to move
proportionally with labour productivity but its level is slightly smaller than
labour productivity. This wage regime satises the private e¢ ciency condi-
tion since it generates a positive surplus to both the rm and the worker.
It also leads to a small fundamental surplus. However, since this wage
regime implies a constant hiring surplus, there would be no response of job
vacancies and unemployment to the productivity shock.
Second, we argue that a small hiring surplusis more transparent than a
small fundamental surplusfor two reasons. One is that we lay out the trans-
mission mechanism behind the small hiring surplus. Whereas Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2015) only explain why the small fundamental surplusmat-
ters. It is di¢ cult to see how the small fundamental surplusworks through
the invisible hand. Secondly, the mathematical expression for the hiring
surplus is the same for di¤erent models since it is simply the hiring cost
which the rm saves from an existing job match. By contrast the mathe-
matical expression for the fundamental surplusvaries with the model spec-
ication15.
We nd that a widely used calibration strategy in the literature implies
a large unemployment volatility. Under this calibration strategy, rms face
a relatively large cost of posting a vacancy, see for example, Hall (2005),
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Hall and Milgrom (2008). This common
feature is obscured by di¤erent time periods used in calibrations in the
literature. We adjust the calibrations used in di¤erent models to make them
all correspond to a monthly frequency. It turns out that this calibration
implies a high vacancy posting cost is associated with low job vacancies and
15 In some cases, it is impossible to derive an expression for the fundamental surplus.
For instance, the DMP model with endogenous job separation or the DMP model with
nancial frictions in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013).
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high vacancy-lling rate since a relatively large vacancy cost reduces vacancy
creation, giving rise to increased labour market slack.
Low job vacancies in equilibrium will lead to a higher equilibrium unem-
ployment rate, given the parameters of the matching function. However a
common target for calibrating search models is to match the average unem-
ployment rate in U.S. This requires higher matching e¢ ciency in the sense
that fewer vacancies are required to form a job match. We calculate the
number of vacancies needed to maintain an equilibrium unemployment rate,
based on the matching functions in di¤erent literatures. This conrms our
argument that the models in the literature that have lower job vacancies in
equilibrium assume higher matching e¢ ciency in order that the models are
able to match observed average unemployment rates.
We further argue that a higher matching e¢ ciency also increases the
vacancy-lling rate, given the wage regimes in the literature. Therefore this
calibration strategy implies a large unemployment volatility.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic equations
of the DMP model. Section 3 shows how the sticky wage and the small hir-
ing surplusact as complements in terms of generating large unemployment
volatility. Section 4 gives a comparison between our arguments and the
fundamental surplusapproach of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) .Section 5
and 6 jointly investigate the impact of the common calibration strategy on
the unemployment volatility. Section 7 concludes.
2 Search and Matching Model
To set the stage, we review the key equations and equilibrium relationships
for a basic continuous time DMP model. There is a continuum of identical
individuals on the unit interval. Each individual inelastically supplies one
unit of labour and consumes all the income they earn. They are innitely
lived and risk neutral with discount rate denoted by r. An individual is
either employed and earning a wage w, or else unemployed and enjoy the
utility of leisure b. If unemployed, an individual nds a job with probability
f: We assume that existing job matches are terminated with probability  .
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Since we assume that all rms are identical, the value of being employed is
thus
rL = w + (U   L) (2.1.1)
while the value of being unemployed is
rU = b+ f(L  U) (2.1.2)
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm can
hire up to one worker who produces an amount y. Existing jobs command
rents y   w for the rm in equilibrium. The value of a lled job is
rJ = y   w   J (2.1.3)
Firms must pay a real xed cost of c to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then
lled with probability q; if the vacancy is lled, the new job match becomes
productive in the following period. The value of a vacant job is then
rV =  c+ q(J   V ) (2.1.4)
Trade in the labour market is uncoordinated, time-consuming, and costly
for both rms and workers. The number of jobs formed in each period is
determined by a matching function M(u; v) where u is the number of job
seekers and v are aggregate vacancies. The matching function M(u; v) is
increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. We
proceed under the assumption that the matching function has the Cobb-
Douglas form, h = muv1  where m > 0 and  is the constant elasticity
of matching with respect to unemployment. Dening  = vu as a measure of
the tightness of the labour market, total hiring h is
h = mu1  (2.1.5)
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The homogeneity of the matching function implies q()0 < 0; q()00 > 0 and
f()0 > 0; f()00 < 0. It is worth noting that  =  q0()=q().
The number of workers who enter unemployment in each period is (1 
u), and the number who leave unemployment is q()u. In equilibrium,
unemployment is constant, so the two ows are equal, (1  u) = q()u. I





Equation (2.1.8) is the rst key equation of the model. It is known as
the Beveridge curve when represented in vacancy-unemployment space. In
equilibrium, free entry in the labour market drives rents from vacant jobs






Condition (2.1.9) states that in equilibrium, the expected prot from a new
job is equal to the expected cost of hiring a worker. Substitute equilibrium
condition (2.1.9) into (2.1.3),
y   w   (r + )c
q()
= 0 (2.1.10)
Equation (2.1.10) describes the marginal condition for the demand for
labour. Total output y is used to pay the wage w and the expected capital-
ized value of the rms hiring cost (r+)cq() .
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3 Sticky Wages and the Hiring Surplus
3.1 Unemployment Fluctuations
Dene the rms benet of hiring a worker, y w, as the hiring surplus,










Equation (3.1.2) shows that a small hiring surplusis associated with a high
rate of lling a job vacancy. Substitute (2.1.6) into (3.1.2) to replace q()







Equation (3.1.3) shows a positive correlation between the hiring surplus
and labour market tightness. A small hiring surplusleads to rms having a
low incentive for vacancy creation, giving rise to low labour market tightness.
A small hiring surpluscan be caused by high unemployment compensation
as in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008); a xed matching cost as in Pissarides
(2009) or credit frictions as in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013).
Recall that aggregate hires are dened as
h = vq() (3.1.4)
Using the denition of labour market tightness, write v as
v = u (3.1.5)











then substituting (3.1.2) and (3.1.3) into (3.1.7) so we can write h as an














This is the rst key equation in this section. For the moment, we use h()






where h0() > 0. We assume that the change in  is caused by productivity
change. Rewrite (2.1.10) as
 = y   w (3.1.10)






This is the second key equation in this section. It shows that the change in
 depends on the wages response to the productivity change. Using (3.1.11)
to rewrite

 as a function of

y and substitute this into (3.1.9),






Recall that in equilibrium, labour inows to employment pool are equal to
labour outows
h() = (1  u) (3.1.13)
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Substitute (3.1.12) into (3.1.14), and we have the following proposition
Proposition 1 In a labour market with search and matching frictions and
exogenous separation rate  , an individual rm pays  to hire a worker
and the free entry condition ensures y = w + . For a given change in
productivity,










where h0() > 0.
3.2 Discussion
Proposition 1 shows the determinants of unemployment uctuations. The
rst determinant h0() captures the rate of change of aggregate hires with
respect to the hiring surplus. The second determinant 1   @w@y measures
the change in the hiring surplusgiven a unit change in productivity. The
constant   1 transfers uctuations in aggregate hires to uctuations in un-
employment. Obviously, the change of the hiring surplusdepends on the
response of the wage to the productivity change, @w@y . If the wage absorbs all
of the productivity change, then the hiring surpluswill not change. This
would lead to no response of aggregate hires to the productivity change. A
sticky wage thus ensures the hiring surplusvaries with productivity16.
To study the rate of change of aggregate hires with respect to the hiring
surplus, we establish the following proposition
16 In a more complex set-up, the hiring surplus can be dened as y   w   z, where
z denotes other production costs. In this case, the change of the hiring surpluscan be




. Normally the literature would assume this extra cost is insulated
from the labour productivity, so @z
@y
= 0. However whether or not this assumption holds,
@w
@y
still plays a key role in determining the change of the hiring surplus.
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Proposition 2 For given parameter value of c, r, and  , if the elasticity of
matching with respect to unemployment satises 0 <  < 1 and if f >  ,
then we have h00() < 0.
Proof. Rewrite the aggregate hires function (3.1.8) as
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assume that 0 <  < 1, we have A > 0.
Dening B = ( 1   2)( + m
1
 [ (r+)c ]
1

 1)   2( 1   1)m
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To see whether B is a negative number, we consider two cases:
I. If 1   2  0, then B is negative and therefore h00() < 0.















Recall that f = m
1
 [ (r+)c ]
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  2) < 1

f (3.2.6)
Rearrange the condition (3.2.6),
f > (1  2) (3.2.7)
A su¢ cient condition to satisfy the condtion (3.2.7) is f >  . Recall that
in equilibrium, we have fu = (1 u). Since u is unlikely larger than 0.5 in
normal case, we have f >  . Therefore in both cases we have h00() < 0.
The implication of proposition 2 is the following. To have a non-trivial
response of aggregate hires to a given change in the hiring surplus, the
hiring surplushas to be small. The causal chain behind this argument is
straightforward. A small hiring surplusgives rms a low incentive for va-
cancy creation. This results in a slack labour market, which in turn shortens
the duration of lling a vacancy and increases the vacancy-lling rate. A
high vacancy-lling rate ensures that any variation in job vacancies is more
likely transmitted to variation in aggregate hires.
Given proposition 2, the negative correlation between the hiring surplus
and the vacancy-lling rate in (3.1.1) leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3 For any  and , we have @h0()=@q() > 0:
Corollary 3 conrms our argument that a high vacancy-lling rate leads to
a large response of aggregate hires to a given change in the hiring surplus.
4 Comparison with the Fundamental Surplus
4.1 Denition
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) argue that a necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition to generate large responses of unemployment to productivity changes
is a small fundamental surplus, the upper bond on the fraction of output
available for vacancy creation. To derive an expression for the fundamental
surplus in the standard DMP model with Nash Bargaining, we combine
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the job creation condition and the wage equation to obtain an equilibrium
condition for labour market tightness. Recall the wage equation under Nash
bargaining17,
w = b+ (y   b+ c) (4.1.1)
Substituting the wage equation into the job creation condition (2.1.10)
gives
y   b = r +  + q()
(1  )q() c (4.1.2)
After implicit di¤erentiation of (4.1.2), we derive the elasticity of labour
market tightness with respect to labour productivity18,
";y =
r +  + q()
(r + ) + q()
y
y   b (4.1.3)
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) denes the fundamental surplusas y  b,
which is what remains after deducting the unemployment compensation (or
say the value of leisure) from the output. Equation (4.1.3) shows that a large
elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to productivity requires a
small fundamental surplus.
4.2 Comparison
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) dene the fundamental surplusas the re-
sources which the invisible handcan allocate to vacancy creation. Whereas
the hiring surplus in this chapter is the resources an individual rm can
allocate to vacancy creation. In the standard DMP model with Nash Bar-
gaining, the fundamental surplus, y  b, is larger than the hiring surplus,
y   w. This is simply because the invisible hand, or a benevolent dictator
in a centralised economy, has more power over resource allocation. More
specically, a rms behavior is bound by the Nash sharing rule however
the invisible hand is not. In spite of this di¤erence, there are still some
linkages between the two. If we substitute the wage equation into the hiring
17See chapter 2 for the details of deriving this standard wage equation.
18See online appendix of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) for the details of this derivation.
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surplus, y   w, we obtain
y   w = y   b  (y   b+ c) (4.2.1)
Rearranging the equation, we have the following relation,
y   w + c = (1  )(y   b) (4.2.2)
Equation (4.2.2) depicts the relation between the fundamental surplus
and the hiring surplus. Since the hiring surplus is positively correlated
with labour market tightness (see 3.1.3), we conclude that a small (large)
hiring surplusleads to a small (large) fundamental surplus.
A major di¤erence between our argument and the fundamental surplus
is that in general we regard the sticky wage as a distinct channel and a
necessary condition for generating unemployment uctuations. Whereas
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) dont specify the role of the sticky wage
in generating unemployment uctuations. To highlight this di¤erence, we
assume an ad hoc wage equation,
w = 'y + & +  (4.2.3)
where ' and & are the coe¢ cients and  is constant. We further assume that
the wage equation satises the following condition,
w < y (4.2.4)
Condition (4.2.4) says the wage should be smaller than the output. This en-
sures that the wage satises the private e¢ cient condition since it generates
a positive surplus to both the rm and the worker. Substituting this wage
equation into the job creation condition, we have the following equilibrium
condition for labour market tightness,
(1  ')y   &   (r + )c
q()
   = 0 (4.2.5)
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After implicit di¤erentiation of (4.2.5), we derive the elasticity of labour





y   w' + &'
(4.2.6)
Under our ad hoc wage specication, the fundamental surplusis simply
equal to y   w' + &' . If we assume that the wage is fully exible in the
sense that the wage moves proportionally with the productivity, then we
have ' = 1. In this case, the elasticity of labour market tightness is 0. This
conrms our argument that the sticky wage is a necessary condition for gen-
erating unemployment uctuations. If we substitute the wage equation into
the expression for the fundamental surplus, it turns out the fundamental
surplusis equal to  . The condition (4.2.4) implies that  must be negative
when ' is equal to 1. So the fundamental surplusis positive. It decreases
to 0 when the wage equals output.
This example shows that if the wage were fully exible, there would be
no uctuations in job vacancies and unemployment even if the fundamental
surplusis small.
5 Large Vacancy Costs
A common feature of the calibration in the post-Shimer literature is giving
a large value to the cost of posting a vacancy. This feature is obscured by the
fact that the literatures choose di¤erent time periods for the calibration. For
example, Shimer (2005) assumes that the vacancy cost is 0.213 on a quarterly
basis. Whereas Hall and Milgrom (2008) assume that the vacancy cost is
0.43 on a daily basis. A short time period used in calibration rationalises
the large value of the vacancy cost. While the diversity of time period in
the literature, since the output is always normalized to one, the value of the
vacancy cost is independent of the time period. To clarify this issue, we
recall the job creation condition





In job creation condition, the value of the interest rate, the job separation
rate and the vacancy-lling rate all depends on the time period of the model.
For instance, if the monthly job separation rate is 0.033, then the quarterly
job separation rate should be about 0.1. However, since those three variables
appear both on the numerator and denominator of the hiring cost, the ratio
(r + )=q() is independent of the time period. Therefore the proportion of
the wage and the vacancy cost to output is independent of the time period.
Since output is normalized to one in all time periods, it turns out that the
calibrated value of vacancy cost is also independent of the time period.
For the sake of comparing di¤erent calibrations in the literature, we
report the values of vacancy costs and equilibrium unemployment used in
di¤erent models in Table 119. We also transform the values of job separation
rates, vacancy-lling rates, labour market tightness, job nding rates and
job vacancies across di¤erent models into monthly equivalents. We can see
that the vacancy cost in the post-Shimer literature at least double that in
Shimer (2005).
Table 1 Comparison of Calibrated Parameter Values in the Literature
Parameter Interpretation Calibrated Value
Shimer Hagedorn and Hall and Hall
(2005) Manovskii Milgrom (2005)
(2008) (2008)
c Vacancy Cost 0:213 0:584 0:433 0:986
 Separation Rate 0:033 0:032 0:030 0:034
 Market Tightness 1:000 0:634 0:500 0:539
q() Vacancy Filling Rate 0:450 0:877 0:960 1:127
f() Job Finding Rate 0:450 0:556 0:480 0:607
v Job Vacancy 0:068 0:035 0:028 0:025
u Unemployment 0:068 0:055 0:055 0:047
Another common feature of the post-Shimer literature is a high vacancy-
19We infer the equilibrium unemployment rate in Shimer (2005) based on the job separa-
tion rate and job nding rate. Shimer (2005) didnt report the equilibrium unemployment
rate.
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lling rate20. We already know that the small hiring surpluscontributes to
this. Now we turn to investigate whether the large vacancy cost also makes
a contribution to the high vacancy-lling rate. To do so, we establish the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the wage elasticity with respect to the vacancy-lling rate
satises the following condition "w;q() <

w , then we have @q()=@c > 0.
Proof : Rewrite the job creation condition as
q() =
(r + )c
y   w : (5.2)





(r + )(y   w) + (r + )c @w@q() @q()@c
(y   w)2 (5.3)
Rearranging equation (5.3),





= (r + )(y   w) > 0: (5.4)
To ensure @q()=@c > 0, the following condition should be satised,
(y   w)2   (r + )c @w
@q()
> 0: (5.5)
Substituting equation (5.2) into (5.5),
y   w > q() @w
@q()
: (5.6)
20A common target of calibration is to match the average post-war U.S unemployment
rate and job nding rate. Therefore the calibrated values of those two variables in the
literature is pretty close to observed values.
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Then multiplying both sides of (5.6) with w and replace y   w by ,





Proposition 4 shows that the vacancy-lling rate increases with the cost
of posting a vacancy if a condition on the wage elasticity is satised. The
wage elasticity with respect to the vacancy-lling rate is negative under
both Nash bargaining and strategic bargaining. In both cases an increase in
vacancy-lling rate will increase the rms threat point in wage bargaining,
therefore decreasing the wage. The wage elasticity is simply equal to zero
when the wage is xed as in Hall (2005). Therefore the wage condition in
proposition 4 is satised in these papers. So the vacancy-lling rate does
increase with the vacancy cost in the literature.
According to Proposition 1 and Corollary 3, we argue that unemployment
uctuations also increase with the vacancy cost. So the large calibrated
value of posting a job vacancy makes a contribution to generating the large
unemployment volatility.
6 Matching E¢ ciency
From Table 1, we can see that despite the large di¤erence in equilibrium
job vacancies, the calibrated unemployment rates in each model are similar.
This indicates that each model assumes di¤erent matching e¢ ciencies. To
compare the matching e¢ ciency, we carry out the following excerise. We
assume that the job separation rate is 3% per month and that the equilibrium
unemployment rate is 5% per month in all the models. Then we calculate
how many job vacancies are needed, based on the matching function in
the di¤erent models, to obtain an unemployment rate of 5%. Our results
are reported in Table-2. Not surprisingly, the model with higher matching
e¢ ciency requires fewer job vacancies.
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Table 2 Comparisons with Matching E¢ ciency
Model Matching Function Parameters
 u 
Shimer (2005) 0:452u0:72v0:28 0:03 0:05 0:115





Hall and Milgrom (2008) 0:68u0:5v0:5 0:03 0:05 0:035
Hall (2005) 0:947u0:235v0:765 0:03 0:05 0:026
A high matching e¢ ciency is a necessary calibration choice to o¤set the
e¤ect of low job vacancies on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Next we
study how matching e¢ ciency a¤ects the vacancy-lling rate and unemploy-
ment volatility. Without loss of generality, we assume the matching function
takes the form of
M = mM(u; v) (6.1)
where m is the matching coe¢ cient. Following the convention, we assume
the matching process is constant return to scale. Therefore, the vacancy-








To proceed, we dene  as the elasticity of matching with respect to
unemployment,  =  q0()=q(). Another way to interpret  is that it
measures the weight on job seekers in matching process. A larger  means
the matching process is more reliant on job seekers. We assume 0 <  < 1.
6.1 The Matching Coe¢ cient m
To investigate how parameter m inuences the vacancy-lling rate, we
establish the following proposition.
91
Proposition 5 For any m > 0, we have @q()@m < 0 if   1 y ww < "w; < 0;
@q()
@m > 0 if "w; > 0 or "w; <   1 y ww ; @q()@m = 0 if "w; = 0:













Substituting (6.2) into the job creation condition (2.1.10),







; 1) = (r + )c (6.5)
Taking the derivative of labour market tightness with respect to the match-
ing coe¢ cient m,
(y   w)M(1



















(y   w)M(1 ; 1)
mM(1 ; 1)
@w















































Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of























































 are denitely positive. Now
consider three cases for "w;,





2. If "w; > 0, which is the case when wage is determined by the Nash




3. If "w; < 0, then the condition for
@q()
@m > 0 is






If   1 y ww < "w; < 0, then @q()@m < 0 holds. 
Proposition 5 shows that the impact of the matching coe¢ cient on the
vacancy-lling rate depends on how the wage responds to labour market
tightness. Under Nash bargaining and strategic bargaining, the vacancy-
lling rate increases with the matching coe¢ cient. According to Proposition
1 and Corollary 3, the unemployment uctuations also increases with the
matching coe¢ cient. However, this conclusion does not apply to the xed
wage case as in Hall (2005).
To investigate the causal chain behind proposition 5, we suppose there is
an increase in matching e¢ ciency. This shortens the duration of lling a job
vacancy and therefore encourages rms to create more job vacancies. This
leads labour market tightness initially to increase.
If the wage had no response to the increase in labour market tightness,
then the job creation condition implies that the equilibrium vacancy-lling
rate would be the same as before the increase in matching e¢ ciency. So
rms would continue to create new job vacancies until the vacancy-lling
rate has decreased to the previous equilibrium level.
If the wage were positively correlated with labour market tightness, like
it is under Nash bargaining, then the increase in labour market tightness
would drive up the wage, diminishing the rms hiring surplus. According
to the job creation condition, a smaller hiring cost is required to achieve a
new equilibrium. This requires a higher equilibrium vacancy-lling rate.
If the wage were negatively correlated with labour market tightness, then
the increase in labour market tightness would drive down the wage, therefore
expanding the rms hiring surplus. According to the job creation condi-
tion, this requires a larger hiring cost to achieve a new equilibrium. This
requires a lower vacancy-lling rate in equilibrium. However if the drop of
the wage were too dramatic so that workers feel better being unemployed
rather than employed and choose to stay in the unemployment pool, then the
wage wouldnt decrease and labour market tightness wouldnt change. The
vacancy-lling rate would increase simply due to the increase in matching
e¢ ciency.
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6.2 The Matching Elasticity 
To study the matching elasticity, we adopt the conventional Cobb-Douglas
matching function used in section 2. The vacancy-lling rate can then be
written as
q() = m  (6.16)
By taking the derivative of the vacancy-lling rate with respect to the
matching elasticity , we establish the following proposition:
Proposition 6 For any 0 <  < 1, when "w; >   1 y ww , we have @q()@ < 0
if "w; > 0;
@q()
@ = 0 if  = 1; and
@q()
@ > 0 if "w; < 0.









To derive an equilibrium condition for labour market tightness, we substitute
(6.16) into the job creation condition (2.1.10),
(y   w)m  = (r + )c (6.18)
Taking the derivative of labour market tightness with respect to the match-
ing e¢ ciency,















=  (y   w)m  ln  (6.20)





 (y   w)m  ln 
(y   w)m  1 +m  @w@
(6.21)
Substituting (6.21) into (6.17) to replace @@ ,
@q()
@
=  m (ln  + 

 (y   w)m  ln 






1  ln  @w@
(y   w)m  +m1  @w@
(6.23)
To see whether @q()@ is a negative number, we consider two cases:
I. If "w; >   1 y ww , we have @q()@ < 0 if
(
 > 1; "w; > 0




@ > 0 if
(
 > 1; "w; < 0




@ = 0 if  = 1:
II. If "w; <   1 y ww , we have @q()@ < 0 if  > 1;
@q()
@ > 0 if  < 1;
@q()
@ = 0 if  = 1:
Proposition 6 establishes the conditions under which the vacancy-lling
rate increases with . In a slack labour market meaning that the num-
ber of job seekers is larger than the number of job vacancies, increasing 
would initially increase the vacancy-lling rate. This is because the match-
ing process more relies on its major participants the job seekers. A higher
vacancy-lling rate encourages job creation, driving up labour market tight-
ness. The new labour market equilibrium depends on how the wage reacts
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to labour market tightness. If the wage does not respond to the increase
in labour market tightness, then the rms hiring surpluswill not change.
The job creation condition implies that rms will continue to create new
job vacancies until the vacancy-lling rate decreases to the previous equi-
librium level. If the wage increases with labour market tightness, as under
Nash or strategic bargaining, then rms hiring surpluswill decrease. The
job creation condition implies that a higher vacancy-lling rate is required
to achieve a new equilibrium. If the wage decreases with labour market
tightness, then rms hiring surpluswill increase. The job creation con-
dition implies that a lower vacancy-lling rate is required to achieve a new
equilibrium.
In a tight labour market meaning that the number of job vacancies is
larger than the number of job seekers, increasing  would initially decrease
the vacancy-lling rate. This is because the matching process now more
relies on its minor participants the job seekers. A lower vacancy-lling rate
discourages the job creation, so labour market tightness decreases. A new
labour market equilibrium still depends on how the wage reacts to the labour
market tightness, as discussed above.
If the labour market has the same amount of job seekers and job vacan-
cies, it makes no di¤erence which side has a larger impact on the matching
process. Therefore increasing  has no e¤ect on the vacancy-lling rate.
7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we argue that a small hiring surplus is a solution to
the unemployment volatility puzzle. This solution has been discussed in the
literature and we are not the rst to consider it, see Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015). The novelty in this chapter is
that we are the rst to lay out the mechanism behind this solution. We
point out that a high vacancy-lling rate, as a result of the small hiring
surplus, plays the key role in generating unemployment volatility. A higher
vacancy-lling rate ensures that any variation of job vacancies has a larger
impact on the variation of unemployment.
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We also develop the argument on sticky wages as a solution to the un-
employment volatility puzzle. We argue that the sticky wage ensures that
the job vacancies vary with the labour productivity. This is essential be-
cause when the job separation is assumed to be constant, the variation of
job vacancies is the only source for the variation of unemployment.
In the second half of the chapter, we argue that a common calibration
strategy in the literature also makes contribution to generating large un-
employment volatility. This calibration strategy raises the relative cost of
creating a job vacancy and increases the matching e¢ ciency. A large cost of
creating a job vacancy may reect some other frictions rms have to face.
For example, rms need to obtain the loans from nanciers before setting
up new positions, which will increase the vacancy cost. One the other hand,




Strategic Bargaining, theDiscount Rate and
Endogenous Job Destruction
Abstract
This chapter contains a critical review of recent developments in the
literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle. Specically, we reassess
the arguments on: strategic wage bargaining; large uctuations in discount




Based on bargaining theory by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (see
Rubinstein 1982, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986), the strategic
wage bargaining, as argued by Hall and Milgrom (2008), challenges one
unrealistic assumption of Nash wage bargaining: the threat made by coun-
terparties during a wage bargain to walk away and terminate the bargain.
This is unrealistic in the sense that bargainers wouldnt so easily abandon
the joint surplus arising from search frictions. Given this fact, the threat
under wage bargaining is better expressed as to extend bargaining rather
than to terminate it.
This changes the determinants of the wage in the DMP model. Under
the threat of terminating the bargain in Nash bargaining, the wage takes
into account the value of outside options for the worker. This largely de-
pends on the probability that the worker can nd a new employer and the
expected wage payment. So it is endogenous to the model and responsive to
the productivity shock. Under the threat of delay in the bargain in strategic
bargaining, the wage takes into account the cost of delay in wage negotia-
tion21. This cost is assumed to be exogenous and constant. One implication
of this change is that the wage will be less responsive to the productivity
shock, which leads a rms surplus and recruiting e¤ort to be more variable
in response to the productivity shock.
Although the xed cost of delay is a conventional assumption in bargain-
ing theory, it is not a realistic assumption in the search frictions model. The
literature does not specify what is the cost of delay in wage negotiation. We
think there can be two basic components. One is the menu cost, which is
the cost spent on initiating a bargaining round. The other is the opportu-
nity cost, which is the lost production due to the delay of reaching a wage
agreement. It might be true that the menu costis xed but the opportu-
nity cost is denitely pro-cyclical. Since the opportunity cost is more likely
21Under strategic bargaining, the bargaining can be terminated for some reasons and
workers will go back to unemployment pool. However this only has a secondary inuence
on the wage.
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to be the main component, it is more realistic to assume a pro-cyclical cost
of delay in wage negotiation.
In the literature, the cost of delay accounts for a large proportion of
productivity (see Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Hall (2015)). So it has
a signicant inuence on wage exibility. In this chapter, we argue that
if we adopt a more realistic assumption on the cost of delay, the model
with strategic wage bargaining cannot replicate the observed unemployment
uctuations under plausible calibrations of structural parameters. However
it is still better than the model with Nash bargaining.
There is a rapidly growing literature focusing on the observed co-movement
between job hiring and discount rates in the U.S stock market. One of the
most recent papers, written by Hall (2015), suggests that the discount rate
in the stock market is a driving force of unemployment uctuations in the
U.S economy. His argument heavily relies on two hypotheses. One is that
the future stream of benets from a new hire is discounted using the discount
rate in the stock market. During the nancial crisis, the risk premium rises.
So the discount rate in the stock market rises. This leads to a lower expected
value of a new job to a rm. Therefore rms have a lower incentive to post
job vacancies.
The second hypothesis is that the wage is insulated from uctuations in the
labour and stock markets. This is essential in Hall (2015) because if the wage
decreases as its response to the discount rate or labour market tightness,
then rms incentives for job creation will be restored. If so, the impact
of discount rates uctuations on unemployment volatility is rather limited.
To avoid such e¤ects, Hall (2015) carefully species the wage equation so
that the wage is totally independent of the discount rate and labour market
tightness.
Given the co-movement between U.S labour market tightness and the
S&P stock market index, we agree with the basic conclusion reached by
Hall (2015) that large uctuations of discount rates in stock market can
be a driving force of unemployment volatility. However we have doubts
about the mechanism Hall (2015) proposed. Specically, we doubt that the
discount rate is the main channel that transmits uctuations in nancial
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markets to job hiring. We show that if Halls hypothesis were true, then if
we endogenize job destruction in the standard DMP model, one implication
would be that job destructions decrease with the discount rates in the stock
market, which contradicts the observed facts in nancial crisis.
We also show that Hall (2015)s results rely heavily on his wage specica-
tion. If the wage regime is switched to standard Nash bargaining, the impact
of discount rates on labour market volatility becomes trivially small. To our
best knowledge, the literature is far from reaching a consensus on wage ex-
ibility. In spite of this, requiring a specic wage specication indicates that
the discount rate channel in Hall (2015) is probably over-emphasized.
Most of the literature on unemployment volatility assumes a constant
exogenous rate of job separation. Therefore modelling the volatility of job
vacancy and unemployment entirely reects uctuations in job creation.
However U.S data shows that both job creation and job destruction respond
to exogenous shocks (see Davis, Haliwanger and Schuh, 1996). As one of
few responses to this fact, Fujita and Ramey (2012) examine the role of job
destruction in generating unemployment volatility. They argue that under
a modest value of leisure, endogenous job separation can enhance the ability
of the DMP model to produce realistic unemployment volatility. However
their model cannot fully match the observed data. Due to the complexity of
modelling both the job creation and job separation, their model is also far
less intuitive.
We show that endogenous job separation can increase the volatility of
labour market tightness, especially when reservation productivity is high.
Reservation productivity is the lower bond of the production below which
job separation occurs. High reservation productivity triggers large ows into
unemployment. Large inows to unemployment slacken the labour market,
increasing the outows from unemployment. The two larger ows lead to a
more volatile labour market.
We also show that reservation productivity is negatively correlated with
aggregate productivity. One implication is that job destruction may not be
a key factor for generating unemployment volatility in normalperiods, but
probably is a key factor in recessions.
102
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic DMP
model. The strategic wage bargaining and the impact of xed cost of delay
in wage negotiation on labour market volatility are discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4, the relation between high discount rates in stock market and
labour market tightness is discussed. Section 5 investigates the implications
of endogenous job destruction, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Search and Matching Model
To set the stage, we review key questions and equilibrium relationships
for a basic discrete time search and matching model. There is a continuum
of identical individuals on the unit interval. Each individual inelastically
supplies one unit of labour in every period and consumes all the income
they earn. They are innitely lived and risk neutral with discount factor
 = (1 + r) 1 where r is the discount rate. An individual is either employed
and earning a wage w, or else unemployed and enjoying utility of leisure b.
If unemployed, an individual nds a job with probability f: At the end of
each period, existing job matches are terminated with probability  . Since
we assume that all rms are identical, the value of being employed is thus
L = w + [U + (1  )L] (2.1)
while the value of being unemployed is
U = b+ [fL+ (1  f)U ] (2.2)
There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm can
hire up to one worker who produces an amount y. Existing jobs command
rents y   w for the rms in equilibrium. The value of a lled job is
J = y   w + [V + (1  )J ] (2.3)
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where V is the value of a vacant job. Firms must pay a real per-period xed
cost of c at the start of each period to post a vacancy22. Vacancies are then
lled with probability q; if the vacancy is lled, the new job match becomes
productive in the following period. The value of a vacant job is then
V =  c+ [qJ + (1  q)V ] (2.4)
Trade in labour market is uncoordinated, time-consuming, and costly
for both rms and workers. The number of jobs formed in each period is
determined by a matching function M(u; v) where u is the number of job
seekers and v are aggregate vacancies. The matching function M(u; v) is
increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree one. We
proceed under the assumption that the matching function has the Cobb-
Douglas form, h = muv1  where m > 0 and  is the constant elasticity
of matching with respect to unemployment. Dening  = vu as a measure of
the tightness of the labour market, total hiring h is
h = mu1  (2.5)










The homogeneity of matching function implies q()0 < 0; q()00 > 0 and
f()0 > 0; f()00 < 0. It is worth to note  =  q0()=q().
The number of workers who enter unemployment in each period is (1 
u), and the number who leave unemployment is q()u. In equilibrium,
unemployment is constant, so the two ows are equal, (1   u) = q()u.
22The cyclicality of the cost of posting a vacancy is discussed in the appendix. For
simplicity, only a xed vacancy cost is considered in this section.
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Equation (2.8) is the rst key equation of the model. It is known as the Bev-
eridge curve when represented in vacancy-unemployment space. In equilib-
rium, free entry in the labour market drives rents from vacant jobs to zero.






Condition (2.9) states that in equilibrium, the expected prot from a new
job is equal to the expected cost of hiring a worker. Substitute equilibrium
condition (2.9) into (2.3),
y   w   (r + )c
q()
= 0 (2.10)
Equation (2.10) describes the marginal condition for the demand for labour.
Total output y is used to pay for the wage w and the expected capitalized
value of the rms hiring cost (r+)cq() .
3 Strategic Wage Bargaining
Hall and Milgrom (2008) address the Shimer critique by replacing Nash
axiomatic bargaining with a sequential strategic bargaining approach (see
Rubinstein 1982, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986)23. The incentive
of the parties to reach agreement depends on the bargainerstime preference
and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. The rm and the worker under-
stand they have a strictly higher payo¤ from reaching agreement rather than
breaking up and accepting the outside options. The rm and the worker take
23Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2015) incorporate the strategic bargaining
approach into a DSGE-type model with search frictions in labour market. They use this
approach to study the response of macro variables to monetary shocks.
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turns making their wage o¤er denoted by wf and ww. In each bargaining
round, each party either accepts the counterpartys o¤er or rejects and pro-
poses a countero¤er. After a delay, the rm incurs a xed cost of delay 
while the worker enjoys the value of leisure b. There is a probability  that
the job opportunity is exogenously destroyed between bargaining rounds. In
that case, the rm and the worker revert to their outside options.24
The value of being employed to a worker, L, and the value of a lled job




1  (1  ) (3.1)
J =
y   w
1  (1  ) (3.2)
where the free-entry condition, V = 0, is imposed in (3.2). Suppose the rm
makes the rst wage o¤er. The bargaining strategy for the rm is to ensure
a worker is indi¤erent between accepting the rms wage o¤er or rejecting
and waiting until the next round to make a countero¤er. As a result, the
worker will accept the rms initial wage o¤er. The optimal condition for
rms wage o¤er, wf , is
wf + U
1  (1  ) = b+ [(1  )
ww + U
1  (1  ) + U ] (3.3)
Rearranging the right hand side of (3.3),
wf
1  (1  ) = b+ (1  )
ww
1  (1  ) + 
1  
1  (1  )(   )U (3.4)
The rm would not propose a wage o¤er lower than wf because the worker
would reject the rms wage o¤er and wait until the next round to make a
countero¤er. In that case, the rm has to pay a xed cost of delay and it
is unlikely to receive an o¤er higher than wf . Also, there is no reason for
24For the worker, the ouside option is unemployment, which has value U . For the rm,
the outside option is simply to quit the labour market.
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the rm to propose a wage o¤er higher than wf . Hall and Milgrom (2008)
argue that the limited inuence of unemployment on the wage results in
large uctuations in unemployment.... To highlight this, we assume  = 
so that U does not inuence wf ;
wf = [1  (1  )]b+ (1  )ww (3.5)
Similarly the optimal workers wage o¤er will ensure a rm is indi¤erent
between accepting the workers initial wage o¤er and rejecting and making
a countero¤er in the next round. The optimal condition for workers wage
o¤er, ww, is
y   ww
1  (1  ) =   + (1  )
y   wf
1  (1  ) (3.6)
imposing the condition  =  ,
y   ww =  [1  (1  )] + (1  )(y   wf ) (3.7)
The expression (3.5) and (3.7) jointly determine wf and ww. We assume
that the rm makes the initial o¤er. In equilibrium, the rst wage o¤er is
accepted. Solving for wf ,
w = wf =
b+ (1  )(y + )
1 + (1  ) (3.8)
Substitute the wage expression (3.8) into the hiring condition (8) to derive
the following expression for equilibrium market tightness
b+ (1  )(y + )










y   b  (1  ) (3.10)
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[y   b  (1  )] (3.14)




[y   b  (1  )] (3.15)
3.1 Discussions
Expression (3.10) says that the risk adjusted discounted cost of delay
(1 ) shrinks the rms resources for vacancy creation as the worker can
exploit this cost when bargaining with the rm. This is reected in wage
equation (3.8). Although the xed cost of delay has been conventionally used
in strategic bargaining, it might not be plausible to say that rms simply
face a xed cost of delay. Although there are some material costs of delay
for the rm, which probably can be seen as xed, the opportunity cost of the
lost production due to the delay of reaching a wage agreement is arguably
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more important. Normally rms have more incentive to hire workers in
a economic boom rather than in a recession because rms face a larger
opportunity of being idle in a boom. This opportunity cost is procyclical.
If we reckon that the opportunity cost is the major cost of delay, it would
be more appropriate to assume the cost of delay is procyclical, y, where
0 <  < 1. In that case, expression (3.10) can be written as
b+ (1  )(1 + )y









y   b  (1  ) (3.17)
































[y   b  (1  )] (3.21)







y   b  (1  ) (3.22)
Expression (3.17) shows that (1   ) appears both in the numerator
and denominator of  if the cost of delay is procyclical. Since we have y > 
under a plausible calibration of , the role of (1  ) in propogating ;y
is reduced. This is probably because the wage is more cyclical when the cost
of delay is cyclical, see (3.8), which leads to the rms marginal benet of
hiring a worker being less cyclical.
To see the quantitative e¤ect of a procyclical cost of delay on the elasticity
of labour market tightness, we calculate the elasticity based on (3.10) and
(3.17). Values of calibrated parameters are close to Hall and Milgrom (2008),
see Table 1. We normalize a time period to be one quarter. Following Hall
and Milgrom (2008), we set the exogenous job separation rate to  = 0:1;
the discount rate is set as  = 0:988; the cost of delay accounts for 27%
of output; matching elasticity is set as  = 0:5 and labour productivity is
normalized to one. The value of unemployment compensation is chosen so
that when the cost of delay is xed the elasticity of labour market tightness
with respect to productivity matches Shimer (2005)s estimation based on
U.S data. Therefore we set b equal to 0:66 which is higher than the calibrated
value of 0:25 in Hall and Milgrom (2008). This is because to derive (3.10)
and (3.17) we set the probability that job opportunity disappears during
bargaining  equal to the exogenous job separation rate so the ow value
of being unemployed does not enter our wage equation (3.8). To obtain a
similar value of equilibrium wage as in Hall and Milgrom (2008), we raise
the value of unemployment compensation.
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Table 1 Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation The Value of
Calibrated Parameter
 Exogenous Separation 0:1
Rate
 Discount Factor 0:988
b Unemployment Compensation 0:66
(y) Cost of Delay 0:27
 Matching Elasticity 0:5
y Labour Productivity 1
Table 2 shows the elasticity of labour market tightness under our calibra-
tion strategy. When the cost of delay is xed, the elasticity of labour market
tightness is 20 times as large as the elasticity of labour productivity. How-
ever if the cost of delay is procyclical to productivity, the volatility of labour
market tightness drops sharply. This indicates that the success of Hall and
Milgrom (2008) to address unemployment volatility puzzle is largely due to
assuming a xed cost of delay in wage negotiations.
Table 2 Elasticity of Labour Market Tightness
 
is xed is procyclical
Elasticity of Labour
Market Tightness 20 15.2
4 High Discount Rates
In recent decades the dominant view in the literature is that uctuations
in productivity are the driving force behind labour market volatility. How-
ever Hall (2015) points out that unemployment did not seem to track the
movements of productivity in the last three recessions in the U.S. He pro-
poses a di¤erent view: the observed large uctuations in nancial discounts
are a potential driving force of unemployment uctuations.
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The causal chain behind his argument is straightforward. When a nancial
crisis hits the economy, risk premiums rise, so discounts rates rise. The
expected discounted value of hiring a worker therefore decreases. So rms
put fewer resources into recruiting new workers and unemployment rises.
There is a sharp contrast between Hall (2015) and the existing literature.
Hall (2015) assumes that the discounted future stream of contributions from
a new hire depends on the discount rate in the stock market. Whereas the
convention in literature is to assume the ow of benets from a newly hired
worker is risk-free. The risk-free discount rates decrease rather than increase
during nancial crisis. One of the implications is that job hiring will be
counter-cyclical and unemployment will be pro-cyclical. However job hiring
decreases and unemployment increases in a recession. This indicates that
under the conventional view the discount rate is not a major driving force
of unemployment volatility.
To layout how the discount rate a¤ects labour market tightness in search
frictions model, we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In a labour market with search and matching frictions with
exogenous separation rate  , an individual rm pays cq() to hire a worker.
The elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the discount rate is
given by
";r =   1




Proof. Recall the job creation condition (2.10) and rewrite it as
q()(y   w) = (r + )c (4.2)





(y   w)  q()@w
@r
= c (4.3)
















since we know that q0()=q() =  , substitute this into (4.4) and dene
";r as r@=@r and "w;r as r@w=w@r,
 (y   w)";r = rc
q()
+ w"w;r (4.5)
from (4.5), we obtain
";r =   1




Proposition 7 shows that a higher elasticity of labour market tightness with
respect to the discount rate is obtained if rms face (i) a smaller marginal
benet from a newly hired worker; (ii) a larger cost of hiring a new worker;
(iii) a larger wage elasticity with respect to the discount rate (if it is positive)
or a smaller wage elasticity (if it is negative); (iv) a larger discount rate and
(v) a smaller matching elasticity with respect to unemployment.
To determine "w;r, we rst consider the wage under Nash wage bargaining.
Recall the Nash bargained wage from chapter 3,
w = (1  )b+ (y + c) (4.7)
where  measures the relative bargaining power of workers. So under Nash
bargaining, the wage co-moves with labour market tightness. Taking the







Substituting (4.8) into proposition 7 gives the following corollary
Corollary 8 If the wage is determined by Nash bargaining, the elasticity of
labour market tightness with respect to the discount rate can be written as
";r =   1




















since we know that q0()=q() =  , substitute this into (4.10) and dene
";r as r@=@r,
 [(y   w) + c]";r = rc
q()
(4.11)
rearranging (4.11) we obtain (4.9).
4.1 Discussions
Corollary 8 implies that the elasticity of labour market tightness with
respect to the discount rate is small when the wage is determined by Nash
bargaining. This is largely due to the comovement between the wage and
labour market tightness. Specically, suppose risk premiums rise in a nan-
cial crisis, so interest rates rise. The expected discounted value of hiring
a worker therefore decreases. Firms put fewer resources into vacancy cre-
ation and labour market tightness decreases. Under Nash bargaining, the
wage also decreases, especially when the workers bargaining power is larger
since the wage is more strongly correlated with labour market tightness in
this case. The decrease in the wage increases the expected discounted value
of hiring a worker. This largely o¤sets the negative e¤ect of increase in
discounts rates on hiring.
From this example we see that how the wage responds to movements in
discounts rates is crucial for ";r. Hall (2015) species the wage using the
strategic bargaining approach. Specically, Hall (2015) assumes that the
actual wage is the average of the wages proposed by the rm and by the
worker. To determine the wage equation under strategic bargaining, recall
the rms proposal for the wage, (3.8), which we deived in the previous
section,
wf =
b+ (1  )(y + )
1 + (1  ) (4.12)
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Substituting this into (3.5), we can infer the workers proposed wage,
ww =
y +  + (1  )b
1 + (1  ) (4.13)







(y + b+ ) (4.14)
An important feature of wage equation (4.14) is that the wage neither
responds to the movements in discounts rates nor responds to the move-
ments in labour market tightness. This result is robust to a more general
specication when  6=  . Under Halls wage specication, we can conclude
that
"w;r = 0 (4.15)
Substituting this into (4.6), we obtain





Comparing (4.16) with (4.9) in corollary 2, we can see that if the two
wage regimes imply a similar level of wage and labour market tightness,
then labour market tightness is more volatile under strategic bargaining.
To quantitatively measure the e¤ect of the two wage regimes on ";r, we
calibrate the models as follows. Following Hall (2015), we normalize a time
period to be one month. The calibration of the model with strategic bargain-
ing is exactly the same as Hall (2015). In the model with Nash bargaining,
the value of workers bargaining power and unemployment compensation are
chosen so that the model can match the vacancy lling rate in Hall (2015).
We use the same calibration strategy as Hall (2015) to calibrate the rest
of the structural parameters in the model with Nash bargaining. Table 3
displays the calibration values of structural parameters. The last three rows
report the steady-state values of endogenous variables.
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Table 3 Calibratiton with Nash and Strategic Bargaining
Parameter Interpretation The Value
N.B. S.B.
 Workers Bargaining Power 0:6 
 Interruption Rate  0:013
 Fixed Cost of Delay  0:567
 Exogenous Job Separation 0:0345 0:0345
r Interest Rate 0:01 0:01
b Unemployment Compensation 0:6 0:4
c Vacancy Cost 0:213 0:213
 Matching Elasticity 0:5 0:5
y Labour Productivity 1 1
! Wage 0:989 0:984
 Labour Market Tightness 1:1 0:59
q() Vacancy Filling Rate 0:924 1
Table 4 reports the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to
the discount rate under two wage regimes. Not surprisingly, labour mar-
ket tightness is much more volatile when wage is determined by strategic
bargaining.
Table 4 Elasticity of Labour Market Tightness
Nash Wage Strategic Wage
Bargaining Bargaining
Elasticity of Labour




Overall the ndings in Hall (2015) are interesting but not denitive. His
conclusion that large uctuations in discount rates in nancial market are a
driving force of the unemployment volatility relies on two assumptions. One
is that rms evaluate the value of a job based on the discount rate in the
stock market. The other is that the wage is insulated from the discount rate
and labour market tightness.
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Hall (2015) argues that the strong correlation between the value of a job
and the S&P stock-market index conrms the rst assumption, see pp.20,
gure-6. To infer the value of a job to the rm, J , he constructs a time series
of the vacancy-lling rate, q, based on Job Openings and Labour Turnover
Survey (JOLTS) data on hiring rate and the number of vacancies, from 2001
through 2014. Then he uses this to calculate the cost of hiring a worker,
c=q,25. The free entry condition in the labour market implies J = c=q. Given
the way he measures the value of a job, it might be better to say the gure-6
in pp.20 indicates a strong correlation between labour market tightness and
the S&P stock-market index. In gure 1, we construct a time series of labour
market tightness based on JOLTS monthly reports on number of vacancies
and unemployment, from 2001 through 2015, and we compare it with the
S&P stock-market index. The similarity between the S&P index and labour
market tightness conrms our argument.
Although U.S stock market data show a positive correlation with the value
of a job estimated by Hall (2015), we cant infer that the discount rate is the
major driving force behind this correlation. If we rewrite the value function
for a job, (2.3), as
J =
y   w
1  (1  ) (4.17)
we can see that the job value is positively correlated with the rms net
prot, y   w, and the discount factor , and negatively correlated with job
separation rate  . The rms net prot and the discount factor are both
positively correlated with stock market value. The job separation rate is
negatively correlated with stock market value at least in recent two reces-
sions26. Therefore it is hard to say which factor is the major driving force.
In the next section with endogenous job destruction, we point out another
issue behind the rst assumption.
Even though we doubt some assumptions in Hall (2015), we do acknowl-
edge the fact that the interest rates can link the dynamics of labour and
25 In a discrete time DMP model, the cost of hiring a worker is c
q
.
26The time series of layo¤s is displayed in gure 2. Comparing with gure 1 and 2, we
can see a negative correlation between job separation and stock market value, especially
in the recent two recessions.
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nancial markets, given the large evidence in the literature (see Hall (2016)
for a detailed survey). Studying this linkage is an interesting topic for future
research.
5 Endogenous Job Destruction
Empirical studies suggest that job destruction might be an important
source of unemployment volatility. In this section, we give an analysis of the
impact of endogenous job destruction on labour market volatility. To set the
stage, we review the key equations in a continuous time search and matching
model based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). There are two types
of shocks in the economy. Apart from the aggregate productivity shock,
an individual rm may also receive an idiosyncratic productivity shock at
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Poisson rate  .27 The productivity of a job is now written as yx, where y
denotes, as in basic matching model, a general productivity parameter and
x an idiosyncratic one. When an idiosyncratic shock arrives, x moves from
its initial value to some new value x0 drawing from a general distribution
G(x) with support in the range 0  x  1. The rm chooses a reservation
productivity R, dened as the productivity level below which production
is not protable, and destroys jobs whose productivity falls below it. We
assume any newly extablished rm-worker pair has value of x equal to 1.
The value of a job with productivity in the range R  x  1 satises




The value of a job to a worker satises
rW (x) = w(x) + 
Z 1
R
W (s)dG(s) + G(R)U   W (x) (5.2)
The value of being unemployed is same as the model with exogenous job
separation, we write it in a continuous time form as
rU = b+ q()[W (1)  U ] (5.3)
The value of vacancy to the rm is written as28
rV =  yc+ q()[J(1)  V ] (5.4)
Free entry in the labour market drives rents from vacant jobs to zero.
Therefore the equilibrium condition for vacancy creation is V = 0, implying
that
27 In the basic matching model,  is the exogenous separation rate. Adapting to this
change, we now write the model in continous time.







We assume that the wage is determined by the Nash sharing rule29
w(x) = (1  )b+ y(x+ c) (5.6)
Substitute the wage equation into (5.1) giving




Next, evaluate (5.7) at x = R and subtract the result from (5.7),
(r + )J(x) = (1  )y(x R) (5.8)
Evaluating (5.8) at x = 1 and making use of zero-prot condition, we have







The job creation condition states that the expected gain from a new job
must be equal to the expected hiring cost that the rm has to pay.
Substitute (5.8) into the integral expression of (5.7) and evaluate the









(s R)dG(s) = 0 (5.10)
Expression (5.10) says the reservation productivity plus a positive option
value (the integral part) which can be obtanied once a new idiosyncratic
shock arrives should be equal to the reservation wage (yR + yr+
R 1
R(s  
R)dG(s) = rU = b   1 cy). Since the reservation productivity is less
than the reservation wage, there is some labour hoarding in the sense that
29For the details of the derivation, see chapter 3.
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rm keeps some currently unprotable workers.
The evolution of unemployment is given by

u = G(R)(1  u)  q()u (5.11)





5.1 Reservation Productivity and Labour Market Volatility
The job creation condition and job destruction condition jointly determine
reservation productivity and labour market tightness. With knowledge of
R and , unemployment is pinned down by the Beveridge curve (5.12). By
combining the job creation condition and job destruction condition, we can
nd an equilibrium condition for labour market tightness.

































Using integration by parts to solve
R 1
R sf(s)ds, we obtainZ 1
R






































Derive the reservation productivity from the job creation condition,
R = 1  c(r + )
(1  )q() (5.16)
Once we substitute (5.16) into (5.15), we get (5.13).
After implicit di¤erentiation of (5.13), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 10 Given a reservation productivity R, the elasticity of labour
market tightness  with respect to the productivity y is
;y =
(r + )













1  ; Fy =
b
y2


























[r + G(R)]cy + cyq()
Substitute R = 1  c(r+)(1 )q() into this, we have (5.17)
122
The reservation productivity R enters two multiplicative terms of the
elasticity of labour market tightness. In the rst term, the role of R is limited
since  is much smaller than q() under reasonable calibrations. Therefore
it is the second term in (5.17) that is critical in generating movements in
labour market tightness. A large R will generate a large value of the second
term. A large R also moves to G(R) closer to unity, which decreases the rst
term. Since the second term dominates, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 11 An increase in reservation productivity will increase the volatil-
ity of labour market tightness.
A high reservation productivity increases layo¤s. This drives up the
ows into unemployment. As a result, the ows out of unemployment also
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increases. This is becasue more new rms will entry the labour market and
open job vacancies. The increase in both ows generate larger uctuations
in unemployment.
Equation (5.16) shows that one cause of a high reservation productivity
is a slack labour market since then the vacancy lling rate is high. This
ensures an employer can more easily ll a newly created more productive
job to replace the current less productive one. A positive relation between
the vacancy lling rate and the reservation productivity is also reected in
U.S data. Figure 2 dispalys the similar movements in job lling rate and
layo¤ rate30.
From proposition 10 we know that labour market tightness is positively cor-
related with the aggregate productivity. Low aggregate productivity there-
fore is associated with low labour market tightness, a high vacancy lling
rate and a large reservation productivity. So in a recession the reservation
productivity will increase. This leads to more layo¤s, therefore increasing
the ows into unemployment. This further reduces labour market tightness
and encourages new hires. However as aggregate productivity is low, inows
to unemployment are larger than outows. So unemployment increases. The
larger ows into and out of unemployment generate larger unemployment
volatility. This implies
Corollary 12 A decrease in aggregate productivity leads to unemployment
and unemployment volatility both to increase.
Proof. According to proposition 10, we know that @=@y > 0. So a de-
crease in aggregate productivity leads to a decrease in labour market tight-
ness. This leads to an increase in the vacancy lling rate (see e.q. 2.6). From
(5.16), we know this will increase the reservation productivity. Then accord-
ing to corollary 11, the volatility of labour market tightness will increase.
So unemployment volatility will increase.
Since a decrease in aggregate productivity leads to a decrease in labour
market tightness, the job nding rate will also decrease. We already prove
30To obtain the job lling rate, we devide the hires by job openings. We use the montnly
data on layo¤ rate, hires and job openings from JOLTS website.
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that when y decreases the reservation productivity will increase so G(R) will
increase. According to the Beverage curve (5.12), the decrease in q() and
the increase in G(R) will lead to unemployment to increase.
5.2 Discounts Rates and Reservation Productivity
Under the conventional view, the reservation productivity depends on the
risk-free discounts rate. In a nancial crisis, risk-free discounts rates drop
so reservation productivity increases. This leads to more job separations
and therefore larger ows into unemployment. Following Hall (2015), if we
assume that r is the discount rate in the stock market, one implication is
that the reservation productivity should have decreased in the recent reces-
sion since the high risk premium increased the discounts rate. This implies
less job separations and therefore less ows into unemployment during the
recession. This contradicts the facts.
6 Conclusion
This chapter gives a critical commentary on recent developments on the
literature of solving unemployment volatility puzzle. Given the ndings in
this chapter, we have a few suggestions for future study on labour market
volatility.
If say the evidence favours sticky wages in the sense of insulation of the
wage from labour productivity, this chapter shows that the strategic wage
bargaining cannot generate enough wage stickiness to replicate the observed
labour market volatility if a more plausible assumption on the cost of delay
is adopted. This calls for other approaches to model wage stickiness.
The literature has noted the co-movement between U.S labour and -
nancial market but hasnt found a plausible channel to explain how the
uctuations in nancial market are transmitted to the labour market. Our
analysis on Hall (2015) shows that in the absence of capital and investment,
purely assuming the discount rates in the stock market as the linkage is not
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convincing.
Our discussion on endogenous job destruction indicates that job separa-
tion may be an important factor for labour market volatility especially in
recessions. Future research should focus on the causes of a high reservation
production and explore what policies can reduce this threshold.
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 4
Discussions on the Cyclicality of Vacancy Cost
Pissarides (2009) sheds light on the role of hiring costs in solving the
unemployment volatility puzzle. The paper argues that apart from the con-
ventional hiring cost, c, which is proportional to the duration of vacancies,
there is another component of hiring costs that is independent of the du-
ration of vacancies. If the hiring costs are shifted from the proportional to
the xed component, the volatility of job creation increases. Surprisingly,
Pissarides (2009) and all other literature in this eld neglects one question:
should the hiring cost c be xed or proportional to the productivity? This
appendix argues that the cyclicality of c is crucial for solving the unem-
ployment volatility puzzle. A pro-cyclical c can make the cost of hiring a
worker even more pro-cyclical, which reduces the response of hiring to the
productivity shock.
A constant vacancy cost
If vacancy cost are constant and equal to c, then, after imposing the zero




which we can substitute into equation (2.3) to arrive at




w = b+ (y   b+ c) (II)
The two expressions for the wage jointly determine the equilibrium value of
:
y   b = r +  + q()
(1  )q() c (III)
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After implicit di¤erentitation of expression (10), we can compute the elas-
ticity of market tightness with respect to productivity as
;y =
(r + ) + q()
(r + ) + q()
y
y   b (IV)
Cyclical vacancy costs
Next, assume instead that the vacancy costs are cy; since the mean of pro-
ductivity is unity, these alternatives are equivalent in steady-state.
Equilibrium condition (III) can be re-written as
y   b = r +  + q()
(1  )q() cy (V)








Substituting the expression (V) into (VI) to replace cy gives
;y =
r +  + q()
(r + ) + q()
b
y   b (VII)
Discussion
Comparing (IV) with (VII), the rst term in both expressions is the same,
however the second term yy b in expression (IV) is replaced by
b
y b in (VII).
Under the standard calibration, value of leisure is smaller than the output,
so ;y is smaller when c is pro-cyclical.
Proposition 13 In a labour market with search frictions, an individual rm
pays c to post a vacancy and pays w for wage. The marginal benet of a
hire is  = y   w. If the cost of posting a vacancy is pro-cyclical, we have
@w
@y jcy> @w@y jc and @@y jcy< @@y jc.
Proof. Recall the wage equation in case of a constant cost of posting a
vacancy, w = (1   )b + (y + c), take the derivative of the wage with
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Similarly, take the derivative to the wage equation in case of a cyclical
vacancy cost, w = (1  )b+ y(1 + c),
@w
@y
jcy= (1 + c) + cy @
@y
Since cy = c holds in equilibrium, this also implies that the two cases share





jc= c > 0
Given the fact that 1 = @w@y +
@
@y , we also have
@
@y jcy< @@y jc.
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